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"In general, all persons able to contract are permitted to determine and control their
own legal relations by any agreements which are not illegal, or opposed to good morals
or to public policy; but the mortgage forms a marked exception to this principle."'

I. INTRODUCTION

"Once a mortgage, always a mortgage." This cryptic comment,
oft-repeated, summarizes a central tenet of mortgage law: The equity
of redemption2 is essential, immutable, and unwaivable. In other
words, every mortgage borrower has the right, at any time after
default, to redeem the collateral by repaying the debt until the lender
has completed a "foreclosure" on the collateral. Indeed, a mortgage
substitute that would dispense with the equity of redemption is the
holy grail of real estate finance, and has captured the efforts and attentions of lawyers and lenders for centuries. 3 Every effort, however
ingenious, has been met by the unyielding resistance of the courts:
one may not "clog the equity of redemption."4 The idea that the equity
1.
4 JOHN D. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1193, at 568-69 (5th ed.
1941).
2.
The equity of redemption refers to the mortgage borrower's:
right after default in every jurisdiction... to perform his obligation under the mortgage
and have the title to his property restored free and clear of the mortgage. The important words to emphasize here are 'after default.' [Tihe mortgagor... has the right to
pay or otherwise perform his obligations after default under the mortgage at any time
until a valid foreclosure sale.
GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WArImAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.1, at 467 (3d ed. 1994).
3.
In Emanual College v. Evans, 21 Eng. Rep. 494, 495 (1625-26), the mortgage was disguised as a 500-year lease in an attempt to avoid the restrictions on mortgages. In Noakes &
Co. v. Rice, [1902] App. Cas. 24, 32 (H.L. 1901) (appeal taken from Eng.), the mortgage provided
(to no avail) that upon default the mortgagor would be barred "from all equity of redemption."
See also H.W. Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1890) (discussing
other early examples including drafting a mortgage as a sale with an option to repurchase, or
creating what we now know as a deed of trust, or using a deed absolute).
4.
Perhaps the classic statement of this is found in Pomeroy's Treatise on Equity
Jurisprudence:
Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage;CollateralAgreements and Agreements Clogging
the Equity of Redemption-In general, all persons able to contract are permitted to determine and control their own legal relations by any agreements which are not illegal, or
opposed to good morals or to public policy; but the mortgage forms a marked exception
to this principle. The doctrine has been firmly established from an early day that when
the character of a mortgage has attached at the commencement of the transaction, so
that the instrument, whatever be its form, is regarded in equity as a mortgage, that
character of mortgage must and will always continue. If the instrument is in its essence
a mortgage, the parties cannot by any stipulations, however express and positive, render
it anything but a mortgage, or deprive it of the essential attributes belonging to a mortgage in equity. The debtor or mortgagor cannot, in the inception of the instrument, as a
part of or collateral to its execution, in any manner deprive himself of his equitable right
to come in after a default in paying the money at the stipulated time, and to pay the
debt and interest, and thereby to redeem the land from the lien and encumbrance of the
mortgage; the equitable right of redemption, after a default is preserved, remains in full
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of redemption is an inherent and inseparable part of every mortgage
is now so commonplace, so accepted, that it elicits relatively little
comment or question.5
A few moments' reflection reveals how odd this doctrine is, especially in the commercial setting. If the equity of redemption is basic
to mortgage law, freedom of contract is equally central to the realm of
commercial finance. Although various procedural restrictions are imposed by law to help ensure that contracts are fair and efficient, the
refusal to enforce a freely negotiated term in a commercial contract
between sophisticated parties, while not totally unheard of, is something of an oddity. 6 The judicial resistance to waivers of protections
by commercial mortgagors appears even more curious when we consider various subsidiary issues. For example, if such protections are
not economically efficient, can their retention, over centuries of litigation and legal change, be squared with the oft-asserted thesis that
the common law tends to adopt economically efficient rules? And if
such protections are economically efficient, why must they be imposed
by the law-wouldn't the parties themselves choose to include these

terms?

force, and will be protected and enforced by a court of equity, no matter what stipulations the parties may have made in the original transaction purporting to cut off this
right.
POMEROY, supranote 1, § 1193, at 568-69.
5.
Mortgage law has not proved completely inflexible as modem economic conditions
have engendered new mortgage forms. In particular, shared appreciation mortgages and equity
participations of various sorts have been reconciled with mortgage law despite concerns that
they might have been held to clog the equity of redemption. See Laurence G. Preble & David W.
Cartwright, Convertible and Shared Appreciation Loans: Unclogging the Equity of Redemption,
20 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 821, 821-23 (1985) (noting that the convertible loan and shared
appreciation loan have changed the structure of real estate financing and that the anti-clogging
doctrine should not be applied to these vehicles).
6.
The inclination to leave commercial parties to the terms of the bargain shows up most
clearly in the judicial reluctance to apply the unconscionability doctrine to protect commercial
actors. See, e.g., Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 973 F.2d 988, 996-97 (1st Cir. 1992)
(declining to find unconscionability where the parties to the contract were "highly sophisticated
business entities"); Tiffany v. Forbes Custom Boats, Inc., No. 91-3001, 1992 WL 67358, at *10
(4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1992) (refusing to apply unconscionability doctrine to contract waiver provision
where the complaining party was a "well-educated, experienced and successful lawyer");
American Cas. Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 944 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1991) (denying
unconscionability protection for bargain struck by "adult business people"); Johnson v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (stating that unconscionability is an extraordinary remedy rarely available to business people); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §
4.28, at 313-14 (1982) ("Courts have generally been chary about using the doctrine of unconscionability to protect merchants and similar professionals and have declined to apply it in favor
of sophisticated corporations." (citation omitted)). But see Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionabilityin
Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065, 1065-66 (1986) (asserting a trend toward the
increasing use of unconscionability doctrine between commercial parties).
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Since mortgages are security interests and mortgage law is in
some sense parallel to the law of personal property security interests,
the answer to these questions should exist somewhere in the extensive literature on secured credit that has developed over the last two
decades. During this period, the efficiency of secured credit has been
at the center of an extended debate, and numerous economic models
have been advanced to demonstrate the ways in which secured credit
may enhance economic relations. 7 The legal analysis once focused on
basic issues of fairness-that is, the efficacy of security interests in
securing repayment for the lender and in avoiding forfeiture by the
borrower.8 The more recent work has focused on efficiency, stressing
the role of secured credit in helping lenders screen the quality of potential borrowers and enabling borrowers to signal their creditworthiness to lenders,9 and in preventing various categories of potential
misbehavior by the debtor' ° or by creditors" during the life of the
2
credit relationship.
See, e.g., Frank H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393
7.
(1986); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronnan, Secured Financing and PrioritiesAmong
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the
Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985);
Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49
(1982); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests,Misbehavior,and Common Pools, 59 U. Cm1. L. REV.
645 (1992); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051
(1984) [hereinafter Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle]; Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and
Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Security Interests]; Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing,86
COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1986) [hereinafter Scott, Relational Theory]; Robert E. Scott, The Truth
About Secured Financing,82 CoRNELL L. REv. 1436 (1997) [hereinafter Scott, The Truth]; Paul
M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067 (1989);
James J. White, Efficiency Justificationsfor Personal PropertySecurity, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473
(1984).
8.
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the
Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349 (1988); Arthur Leff, Injury, Ignorance and
Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970); William C. Whitford, The
AppropriateRole of Security Interests in Consumer Transactions,7 CARDozO L. REV. 959 (1986)
[hereinafter Whitford, Appropriate Role]; William C. Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer
Credit Collection System, 1979 WiS. L. REV. 1047 [hereinafter Whitford, A Critique].
9.
See, e.g., Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 7, at 14-21 (reviewing signalling
theories).
10. The literature initially focused on the role of secured credit in enabling creditors to efficiently monitor the activities of the debtor during the life of the loan. See, e.g., Jackson &
Kromnan, supra note 7, at 1149-58 (proposing reduced monitoring costs as the principal benefit
of secured credit); Levmore, supra note 7, at 55-57 (explaining secured credit as a mechanism
for allocating responsibility and compensation for monitoring among creditors); Schwartz,
Security Interests, supra note 7, at 11 n.28 (critiquing the monitoring cost explanation proposed
by Jackson and Kronman); Shupack, supra note 7, at 1073-83 (reviewing scholarly theories concerning secured credit). More recently, the literature has explored the manner in which secured
credit may serve a "bonding" function. That is, collateral may serve as a "hostage" that ensures
proper behavior by the debtor, thus reducing the amount of monitoring needed by creditors.
See, e.g., Scott, The Truth, supranote 7, at 1450-52.
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This focus on the creation and life of the credit relationship,
however, has lured attention away from the functions of the law upon
default. This Article examines a commonly overlooked function of secured credit: establishing a constructive framework for renegotiation-rather than enforcement-upon default. An appreciation of this
function is central to a full understanding of secured credit and, more
particularly, of the proper shape of the legal rules that govern the enforcement of secured credit.
Moreover, it is commonplace for economic analyses of law to
propose the use of majoritarian contractual defaults-that is, to propose that if a term has not been specified in a contract, the court
should fill the gap by applying the term parties like the plaintiff and
defendant would have chosen had they negotiated it (presumably, the
ex ante profit-maximizing rule). 13 The standard corollary is that, if
the parties have specified a term in their contract, it presumably
reflects the economically efficient provision and should therefore be
enforced. Recent research has shown, however, that contractual
terms will not always reflect the efficient outcome, even in
transactions between knowledgeable and sophisticated parties
operating in competitive markets. 14 As shown below, secured creditor
remedies appears to be an area where this is true, a fact with
significant ramifications for how we should think about the law of
secured transactions. 15
This Article approaches these issues by examining the role of
the equity of redemption (and other borrower protections) in mortgage
law. The thesis is that the equity of redemption-the immutable core
of mortgage law-can best be understood as a mechanism for creating
efficient incentives for the lender and borrower to renegotiate the
terms of their contract should default occur. This perspective takes
aspects of the law that are otherwise perplexing-like the insistence

11. For a recent discussion of the functions of security in reducing lender misbehavior, see
Picker, supranote 7, at 657-63, 669-70.
12. See, e.g., George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions ofImperfect Information,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 228 (1992) ("The most plausible explanations of secured debt advanced
in the literature are the following: (a) it reduces the cost of screening the borrower before its
debt is purchased; (b) the borrower's willingness to grant security is a reliable indicator of its
creditworthiness; (c) secured debt reduces the cost of monitoring the borrower after the debt is
purchased; and (d) it reduces the cost of enforcing a debt claim in the event that the borrower
defaults.")
13. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90-91 (1989); Robert E. Scott, A Relational
Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts,19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597,607 (1990).
14. See infra Part VI.
15. See id.
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that even sophisticated commercial parties cannot waive their protections in the initial loan documents but may be able to waive them
in a workout agreement, 16 and the fact that the primary remedy
available to secured creditors (foreclosure) is rarely utilized' 7-and
demonstrates their underlying coherence.
Although this Article examines real property mortgages, the
underlying analysis is generally applicable to personal property
security interests, and it provides an important counterpoint to a

prominent tendency in discussions surrounding the newly-proposed
revision of Article 9. The new draft of Article 9 nearly bifurcated the
post-default rights of consumer and commercial debtors on the
plausible ground that commercial debtors, unlike consumers, have
sufficient bargaining power to contract with lenders for efficient
remedies1 s However, as shown below, the dynamics of the credit
market may in fact preclude the negotiation of efficient post-default
provisions even for commercial debtors.19
Unless this point is
meaningfully addressed, the assumption that commercial parties can
fend for themselves is problematic.
This Article is divided into two broad sections. The first half
reviews the law and commentary on mortgagor protections. Part H
provides a brief overview of the equity of redemption and other mortgagor protections and the traditional legal justifications for their

16. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 151-53.
18. The extent to which the protections afforded by Article 9 should be waivable in commercial versus consumer transactions has been a topic of considerable debate in the deliberations over Revised Article 9, as evidenced by numerous changes over the course of the Article's
drafting. As of the Proposed Final Draft dated April 15, 1998, subsection 9-602(a) provided for
an extended list of rights of debtors and obligations of creditors that were not waivable;
however, subsection (b) stated that: "An obligor other than a consumer obligor in a consumer
goods transaction or a secondary obligor may waive or vary the rules referred to in subsection
(a) to the extent and in the manner provided by other law." In other words, these rights were to
be generally waivable by commercial borrowers. However, the draft approved (subject to style
correction) by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws on July 30, 1998 omitted subsection 9-602(b), thus eliminating the general
ability for commercial debtors to waive these protections. Nonetheless, a number of the
protections in the Revised Article 9 apply only to consumer transactions. For example, section
9-613 provides a safe-harbor, "except in a consumer-goods transaction," regarding the required
contents of a notification of disposition; section 9-616(b) requires a notice and explanation of
surplus or deficiency to be sent in a consumer-goods transaction; and, section 9-620 provides
different rules for the right of the secured party to accept the collateral in satisfaction of the
debt where the collateral is "consumer goods." Moreover, some individual provisions permit
waiver by non-consumer debtors but not by consumer debtors or in transactions involving
consumer goods. Thus, section 9-207(4) provides for the secured party's right to use or operate
collateral "except in the case of consumer goods, in the manner and to the extent agreed to by
the debtor."
. 19. See infra Part VI.

1999]

EQUITY OFREDEMPTION

605

status as mandatory, unwaivable rules. -Part III examines the range
of explanations that have been advanced by commentators to supplement the traditional reasoning of the courts, demonstrating in each
case the shortcomings of the explanation in the context of commercial
transactions.
The second half of this Article advances a new justification for
the law's insistence on the equity of redemption in commercial
mortgages. Part IV offers a more detailed exploration of the functions
of mortgage law and examines the problems inherent in the mortgage
loan workout situation, while Part V demonstrates the role of the
equity of redemption in resolving these problems. Part VI then shows
that, even if the equity of redemption is an efficient term, negotiations
among market actors may not result in its contractual adoption, thus
providing an economic rationale for its imposition as a peremptory
command of law rather than a default rule.
II. THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION AND MORTGAGOR PROTECTION LAWS
American Colossus Real Estate Trust ("Colossus"), owner of
over $2 billion worth of apartment buildings across the United States,
borrows $22 million from First National Bank of Big City ("FNB") to
acquire another building for its portfolio. Two years later, Colossus
defaults and FNB seeks to enforce its rights under its loan agreement,
note, mortgage, and guaranties. As any real estate practitioner
knows, and any novice could learn with a few minutes research, FNB
cannot enforce its contractual rights. Rather, it can enforce some of
those rights, subject to considerable state-law limitations, in a
specified order and manner-even if its contractual agreements say
otherwise. FNB has those remedies accorded a mortgagee, and no
more; Colossus has the rights and protections accorded a mortgagor,
even if it explicitly waived them in its contractual agreements.
Mortgage law is remarkable in modern finance in the extent to which
it is governed by concepts of status ("mortgagor" and "mortgagee")
rather than contract, relegating parties to pre-defined positions with
mandatorily imposed rights and remedies. A mortgagee may take
certain steps, in a certain defined order, at the risk of forfeiting its
rights. A mortgagor has various opportunities to cure its default,
redeem its collateral, or escape deficiency liability, all defined by law.
In its simplest form, the mortgage could be understood as an
agreement that if FNB's loan were not repaid, Colossus would permit
FNB to satisfy the debt with the mortgaged property. The comple-
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mentary problems that are commonly said to lie at the heart of foreclosure law are the risk of forfeiture of the debtor's equity 2o in the
collateral and the realization of an unjust windfall by the foreclosing
lender. That is, suppose the property has a fair market value of $27
million and FNB forecloses its $22 million mortgage. If the property
were simply turned over to FNB upon Colossus' default, or if a
foreclosure sale were held and (as is often the case) the lender bids on
the property for the amount of the debt, then FNB would receive $27
million in property to satisfy a $22 million debt, for a windfall gain of
$5 million. Conversely, in either of these scenarios, Colossus would
suffer a forfeiture of $5 million of "equity" in the property.
Concern over this risk of forfeiture is said to lie behind almost
every major element of mortgage law.21 Start with the equity of redemption, which is the borrower's right to redeem the property by
repaying the debt at any time until the foreclosure22 has been completed. The equity of redemption provides the borrower with the
right, even after default, to repay the mortgage debt and free the
property from the mortgage lien, and so retain any value that the
property has in excess of the debt. The equity of redemption has been
an established rule of mortgage law since the early seventeenth
century and was the first major legal protection for mortgage
borrowers.2

20. A borrower's "equity" refers to the value of the property in excess of the liens on that
property. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990).
21. See, e.g., James Geoffery Durham, In Defense of Strict Foreclosure: A Legal and
Economic Analysis of MortgageForeclosure,36 S.C. L. REV. 461, 470 (1985); Sheldon Telth, The
Myth of Strict Foreclosure,4 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 575-76 (1937). This concern is not unique to
real property foreclosure. Ronald Mann recently cited this threat of forfeiture as one of the
major functions of secured credit, using the example of a $120,000 loan secured by a lien on a
drill press, which could be sold on foreclosure for $100,000, and the loss of which would diminish
the value of the borrower's business by $400,000. See Ronald J. Mann, Explainingthe Patternof
Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 646-47 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Explaining].
According to Mann, the lender's ability to inflict a $300,000 loss (the $400,000 decline in the
value of the business less the $100,000 value realized upon foreclosure) is crucial leverage to
compel the borrower to repay the debt. See id. Mann's example does not discuss why a
borrower who can gain $400,000 by purchasing a new drill press for $120,000 would be unable
or unwilling to do so-a possibility that reduces the lender's ability to inflict a loss from
$300,000 to $20,000, and that Professor Mann has since recognized. See Ronald J. Mann,
Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REv. 159, 215-19 (1997)
[hereinafter Mann, Strategy].
22. While we commonly talk about "foreclosing a mortgage," it is more precise to refer to
foreclosing the equity of redemption. That is, a decree of foreclosure determines that after a
specified date or event, the borrower will have no further right to redeem the property. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 646 (6th ed. 1990).
23. See generally David Sugarman & Ronnie Warrington, Land Law, Citizenship and the
Invention of "Englishness.' The Strange World of the Equity of Redemption, in EARLY MODERN
CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 111, 111-21 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995).
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Under strict foreclosure (where foreclosure vests title in the
lender), there will be a forfeiture by the borrower and a windfall to
the lender if the property is worth more than the debt.2
The
American attempt to solve this problem is found in the foreclosure
sale: the property is sold at auction, in an attempt to secure the value
of the property for application to the debt, with any excess returned to
the mortgagor.m
Foreclosure sales, in turn, are criticized for routinely realizing
less than the fair value of the foreclosed properties. 26 While the rule
in England is that the lender may not purchase the mortgage property, 27 in America the lender is almost always the purchaser, buying
the property for the amount of the debt or less.2 Other bidders are
24. See, e.g., Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale As De
Facto Strict Foreclosure-AnEmpiricalStudy of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale,
70 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 859 (1985) (noting that this result was unfair, harsh, and oppressive).
This statement must be qualified by recognition of the substantial costs that the lender may incur in converting its ownership of illiquid real property into cash. It is quite possible that the
property is worth more than the debt, and thus the borrower faces a forfeiture, yet the lender
will not realize a windfall because of the substantial transaction costs involved in foreclosing
upon and disposing of the collateral. See Mann, Strategy, supra note 21, at 221-25; Debra
Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of
Foreclosuresand a Proposalfor Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 675-77 (1997).
25. Interestingly, "[i]n some early cases mortgagors complained that foreclosure by sale
benefitted mortgagees and sought to have mortgagees limited to a decree of strict foreclosure.
This objection, though sometimes conceded by the courts, was brushed aside on the ground that
the sale would equally benefit mortgagors." Teffl, supra note 21, at 589 (citing Lansing v.
Goelet, 9 Cow. 346 (N.Y. 1827); 2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1025 n.1 (13th ed.
1886)). The mortgagors' objections arose from the liberal way strict foreclosure had been
applied by the English Chancellor, giving mortgagors repeated opportunities to exercise the
right of redemption and even to reopen the foreclosure and redeem after the foreclosure had
been completed. This is still true in England today. See E.H. BURN, CHESHIRE AND BURN's
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 702 (15th ed. 1994). As a result, mortgages in England are

normally enforced by exercise of a power of sale, rather than by foreclosure, and execution of the
contract of sale terminates the mortgagor's equity of redemption. See id. at 696.
26. For some recent examples of this criticism, see James S. Hering, Real Property
Foreclosure in Texas: What is Deficient About the Texas Deficiency Judgment Statute?, 37 S.
TEE. L. REV. 377, 380-81 (1996); Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift from Power to Process: A
FunctionalApproach to ForeclosureLaw, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 78-79, 95 (1996).
27. See BURN, supra note 25, at 700.
28. This is not a new observation. See, e.g., Edgar Noble Durfee & Delmar W. Doddridge,
Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 MICH. L. REV. 825, 833
(1925) (noting that "in nearly every case the property is bid in by the mortgagee"); Robert Y.
Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble: Lender's Remedies Need an Overhaul, 31 Bus. LAw. 1927, 1937
(1976) (stating that "in about 99 percent of public foreclosure sales the mortgagee ends up as the
only bidder"); Mattingly, supra note 26, at 78 n.7 (discussing several studies of this
phenomenon); Teflt, supra note 21, at 590 (noting, in 1937, that "[i]n practice, therefore, the
mortgagee had little competition at the sale and usually became the successful bidder"). Patrick
Bauer provides some data that supports these observations, finding that out of 1,831 mortgage
foreclosure sales in two Iowa counties between 1881 and 1980, the foreclosing creditor
purchased the property 1,672 times (91.3%). See Patrick B. Bauer, Statutory Redemption
Reconsidered: The Operation of Iowa's Redemption Statute in Two Counties Between 1881 and
1980, 70 IOWA L. REv. 343, 361 (1985). Debra Stark found that third parties were the prevailing
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discouraged by a variety of factors, including the difficulty of securing
adequate information about the property and arranging financing for
a foreclosure sale purchase.29 Thus, the argument goes, properties
seldom bring their fair market value when sold at foreclosure, and are
often sold for less than the amount of the mortgage debt even if the
property is worth substantially more.3 0 Although some states permit
non-judicial foreclosure while others attempt to offer a greater degree
of protection to borrowers by requiring foreclosure through judicial
process, this criticism is made under both systems.31
The perceived inadequacy of foreclosure sales led many states,
during the nineteenth century, to adopt a second category of mortgagor protection laws: statutory rights of redemption.32 Under these
statutes, a borrower has the right to redeem the property from the
foreclosure sale purchaser by paying the amount bid at the foreclosure
sale (with interest and costs, in some cases), for months and in some
cases years after the foreclosure sale. Statutory rights of redemption
have been justified on various grounds. By permitting the mortgagor
to retain possession through the statutory redemption period, the disruption of foreclosure is reduced. 3 Moreover, the extended redemption period may permit a borrower facing temporary hardships to recover and redeem the property.3 But the primary justification for the
statutory right of redemption is that it forces purchasers to bid the
full value of the property to protect themselves from the risk of postsale redemption.35 Alternatively, statutory redemption rights are
justified as providing a remedy for the mortgagor in those cases where
the bid price is inadequate. 36
bidders in approximately 10% of Illinois judicial foreclosure sales in 1993 and 1994. See Stark,
supra note 24, at 663. Steven Wechsler found that mortgagees purchased the foreclosed
property in approximately three-quarters of the foreclosure sales he studied, with third parties
purchasing the foreclosed property in one-quarter. See Wechsler, supra note 24, at 870.
29. See Mattingly, supra note 26, at 94-102; Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of
MortgagorProtectionLaws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 493 (1991); Stark, supra note 24, at 651.
30. See generally Mattingly, supra note 26, at 85-88 (arguing that foreclosure sales are
neither conducted in a commercially reasonable manner nor by a method that produces competitive bidding).
31. See, e.g., id. at 95 (noting that the sale process is remarkably similar once a court orders a foreclosure).
32. See Bauer, supranote 28, at 345 n.9; Teffl, supra note 21, at 590.
33. See Patrick B. Bauer, JudicialForeclosureand Statutory Redemption: The Soundness
of Iowa's Traditional Preference for Protection over Credit, 71 IOwA L. REv. 1, 70-71 (1985);
Wechsler, supra note 24, at 860.
34. See Durfee & Doddridge, supranote 28, at 839; Schill, supra note 29, at 496.
35. See Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 28, at 840; J. Douglass Poteat, State Legislative
Relief for the Mortgage Debtor During the Depression, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 517, 526
(1938); Wechsler, supra note 24, at 860.
36. See Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 28, at 839-40.
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Finally, many jurisdictions have anti-deficiency statutes.
Products of the Great Depression,3 7 these statutes bar lenders from
bringing deficiency actions against borrowers on certain types of loans
(such as residential mortgages 8 or purchase money mortgages 39), or
after non-judicial foreclosure sales,4 or they limit deficiency
judgments to the amount of the debt less the fair value of the property
41
if the property sells for less than fair value at the foreclosure sale.
Anti-deficiency statutes are perceived as another source of protection
for the borrower against the inadequacies of foreclosure: at least if
the property sells for less than its fair value, the borrower is not liable
to make up the difference to the lender.
Thus, the equity of redemption, statutory rights of redemption,
and anti-deficiency statutes are all responses, at least in part, to the
perceived risk of forfeiture. Despite these protections, commentators
continue to decry the inadequacy of the foreclosure process as a
means of realizing the full value of the collateral for borrowers.42
While it is true that cases of forfeiture can be found, however, common sense and empirical data both call into question .the perception
that forfeiture is a substantial problem.43 For example, in a recent
examination of foreclosure sales in Cook County, Illinois, Debra
Pogrund Stark found that more than two-thirds of all judicial
foreclosure cases were dismissed before the sale, indicating that
borrowers "were able to protect their equity in the property."4
Moreover, in roughly ninety percent of the foreclosure sales held, the
37. For a discussion of the enactment of anti-deficiency statutes (and other mortgagor protections) during the Great Depression, see generally Poteat, supranote 35.
38. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-814(G) (West 1990) (no deficiency action against
one- or two-family dwellings); CAL. CIrV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West Supp. 1999) (no deficiency
judgment against dwelling of up to four families occupied by purchaser).
39. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.06 (West 1994) (mortgagee will not be able to bring a
deficiency suit where mortgagee is the purchaser and the loan was for the purchase price of the
property involved); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1997) (the mortgage notes must explicitly identify the mortgage as a purchase money mortgage to be afforded this protection); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 88.070 (1998) (no deficiency judgments on purchase money mortgages).
40. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West Supp. 1999) (referring to "deed of trus").
41. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-108 (1998) (covers "any case involving a foreclosure of a
mortgage"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 6324 (West Supp. 1998) (provided the mortgagee is
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1371 (McKinney 1979)
(provided the judgment is 'just and equitable"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1996) (looks to
"fair value," not foreclosure sale value).
42. Mattingly, for example, argues for substantial revisions to the foreclosure process
primarily to mitigate the risk of forfeiture. See Mattingly, supra note 26, at 113-32.
43. Most recently, Mann has provided an important empirical validation of this point.
Examining the secured lending of a finance company, a bank, and an insurance company, Mann
found that lenders seldom foreclose because of the expectation that they will realize very little
from a forced liquidation of the collateral. See Mann, Strategy, supra note 21, at 166-212.
44. Stark, supra note 24, at 663.

610

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:599

value of the property was not great enough to yield a windfall for the
lender, given the amount of the debt and the foreclosure sale and
carrying costs. 45 In an earlier empirical study of foreclosure sales in
New York State, Steven Wechsler found that mortgagees profited on
about half the resales of properties in which they purchased, but they
incurred losses on the other half, with the losses outweighing the
gains.46 These results are supported by a recent study of distressed.
residential loans in Texas, which indicated that distressed borrowers
with equity tend to sell their properties and repay the mortgage,
while distressed borrowers with little or no equity force the lender to
foreclose. 47 In other words, defaulting borrowers are generally
48
rational and do not quietly permit the forfeiture of their equity.
Regardless of the true extent of the "lost value" problem toward which mortgagor protections are supposedly directed, the law is
jealous of any potential imposition on these various mortgagor protections. The equity of redemption is universal: it exists in every
state, and in every mortgage. 49 It cannot be waived in the loan
agreement or mortgage 0 and any attempt to avoid or limit ("clog") the
equity of redemption as part of the initial transaction is void. 51 The
45. See id.
46. See Wechsler, supra note 24, at 882; see also Jerry R. Jackson & David L. Kaserman,
Default Risk on Home MortgageLoans: A Test of CompetingHypotheses, 47 J. RISK & INS. 678,
685-87 (1980) (showing that default depends more on rational borrower choice than
opportunistic mortgagee actions).
47. See Thomas M. Springer & Neil G. Waller, Termination of Distressed Residential
Mortgages: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 43, 43-48 (1993) (examining
209 distressed Texas mortgages and determining that the borrowers' "equity position" is the
best predictor of foreclosure).
48. This may also shed light on the failure of third parties to bid at most foreclosure sales.
If foreclosure sales most often do not result in windfalls for the purchaser, then there is even
less reason for a potential purchaser to put up with the various impediments faced at a typical
foreclosure sale. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
49. For an excellent discussion of the difficulties that the equity of redemption has caused
for modem real estate financing techniques, see Jeffrey L. Licht, The Clog on the Equity of
Redemption and Its Effect on Modern Real Estate Finance, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 452 (1986).
The point of this Article is not to critique the application of mortgagor protections to any
particular financing structure, but to explore the value, if any, in mandating protections for
commercial mortgagors.
50. See, e.g., Oakland Hills Dev. Corp. v. Lueders Drainage Dist., 537 N.W.2d 258, 263
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Russo v. Wolbers, 323 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 3.1 (1997). The Restatement
provides:
(a) From the time the full obligation secured by a mortgage becomes due and payable
until the mortgage is foreclosed, a mortgagor has the right to redeem the real estate
from the mortgage under the principles of§ 6.4.
(b) Any agreement in or created contemporaneously with a mortgage that impairs the
mortgagor's right described in subsection (a) of this Section is ineffective.
Id. Or, as it has been more artfully stated, "[no words of Scrivener nor any invention of
Counsel can make that which was intended as a mortgage to work as an absolute assurance."
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law is less clear, however, when it comes to waivers of the equity of
redemption as part of a voluntary workout between the borrower and
lender. Some courts permit such waivers if the court, after careful
scrutiny, is convinced that the waiver is substantively fair to the borrower.52 Many statutory protections are also unwaivable, although
the rule is not universal. And although some of these statutory protections distinguish between categories of mortgages, many apply to
all mortgages.
The standard judicial explanation for the peremptory nature of
mortgagor protections is that desperate borrowers are helpless in the
face of lenders' demands and so must be safeguarded from unfair oppression. The classic statement is from the 1762 case of Vernon v.
Bethell: "[N]ecessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to
answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty
may impose upon them."53 Or, as the New Jersey Court of Chancery
wrote in a still-cited 4 1832 case:
There would have been, without [judicial protection of the equity of
redemption], a door open for the imposition of every kind of restraint on the
equity of redemption, and thereby the borrower, through necessity, would have
been driven to embrace any terms, however unequal or cruel; which would

Sugarman & Warrington, supra note 23, at 116 (quoting LORD NOTTINGHAM'S MANUAL OF
CHANCERY PRACTICE AND PROLEGOMENA OF CHANCERY AND EQUITY 280 (D. Yale ed., 1975)).

52. See, e.g., Ringling Joint Venture II v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 595 So. 2d 180, 183 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding executory deed in lieu of foreclosure as part of an extension
agreement after default, but noting that "[sluch arrangements should be carefully scrutinized to
assure that they do not violate the favored right of redemption"); Gillam v. Michigan Mortgage
Inv. Co., 194 N.W. 981, 982 (Mich. 1924) (stating that a commercial debtor may waive the equity
of redemption in a workout, where the waiver is "supported by reasonably adequate
consideration" and is "fairly made without fraud and duress"); Oakland Hills Dev. Corp., 537
N.W.2d at 263-64 ("Courts must carefully scrutinize any transaction in which a mortgagor
waives the equitable or statutory right of redemption."); Russo, 323 N.W.2d at 390 ("[Any
contract by which the mortgagor sells or conveys his interest to the mortgagee is viewed
suspiciously and is carefully scrutinized in a court of equity. [The exchange] must be fair, frank,
honest, and without fraud, undue influence, oppression or unconscionable advantage .... );
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Doerr, 303 A.2d 898, 908 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1973)
("[A]lthough a mortgagor can at a later date, after the original mortgage transaction, surrender
his equity of redemption to the mortgagee and enter into an option or agreement to sell, it must
be a fair bargain for an independent and adequate consideration. From the earliest days courts
of equity have carefully scrutinized such arrangements."). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. f, illus. 13-15 (1997) (stating that deed in lieu of foreclosure

transactions are valid, but executory deed in lieu transactions-which waive the equity of
redemption upon any future default-are not); id. § 3.1 reporters' note, at 114 (stating that the
treatment of executory deed in lieu transactions 'represents a close question under the clogging
principle.").
53. Vernon v. Bethell, 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 839 (Ch. 1762).
54. See, e.g., Blackwell Ford, Inc. v. Calhoun, 555 N.W.2d 856, 859 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996);
Humble Oil, 303 A.2d at 907.
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have tended greatly to the furtherance of usury, and the conversion of the
equitable jurisdiction of the court into an engine of fraud and oppression. 55

This "unfair bargaining power" justification is susceptible to
several obvious criticisms. First, the need to protect necessitous borrowers does nothing to explain why wealthy and sophisticated commercial borrowers cannot waive the equity of redemption. 56 Indeed,
the historical timing of the equity of redemption seems to fly in the
face of this rationale, since it arose in England at a time when loans
were increasingly being made to wealthy merchants rather than
"necessitous men."57 Second, if credit markets are competitive, competition will prevent lenders from taking undue advantage of borrowers: If one lender insists on unreasonable terms, the borrower can go
to the lender down the block. 58 On the other hand, if the market is
not competitive and the lender does have market power, the prohibition of one term (waiver of the equity of redemption) will not solve the
problem; the lender can use its market power to extract some other
concession from the borrower, such as a higher interest rate. 59 Thus,
if the equity of redemption is to be justified on the grounds of unequal
bargaining power, it is important not only to specify what market
failure has created this inequality of bargaining power, but also to
explain why prohibiting one type of term (waiver of protections upon
default) is a meaningful solution to the problems caused by this inequality. 60 In short, the case law lacks a coherent and convincing ex-

55. Youle v. Richards, 1 N.J. Eq. 534, 538 (N.J. Ch. 1832). Comparable statements are legion. See, e.g., Conway's Ex'rs & Devisees v. Alexander, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 218, 237 (1812)
("[A]s lenders of money are less under the pressure of circumstances which control the perfect
and free exercise of the judgment than borrowers, the effort is frequently made by persons of
this description to avail themselves of the advantage of this superiority, in order to obtain
inequitable advantages.")
56. See, e.g., Lifton, supra note 28, at 1942-45 (advocating broader differentiation in rules
applicable to commercial versus consumer mortgagors, because "[commercial borrowers are]
equally, if not more, sophisticated than the lender; their bargaining powers are comparable and
their equity claims are essentially the same-they each represent competing business interests").
57. William M. McGovern, Jr., Forfeiture, Inequality of Bargaining Power, and the
Availabilityof Credit: An HistoricalPerspective, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 141, 146-47 (1979).
58.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 127-29 (5th ed. 1998); Alan

Schwartz, The Law and Economics Approach, in UNIVERSAL ECONOMICS: ASSESSING THE
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH 221, 231 (Gerard Radnitzky ed., 1992).
59. Moreover, it is likely that even a party with market power would prefer to establish a
contract with efficient terms and use its market power to extract a higher price, rather than impose inefficient terms on the transaction, and that striking the objectionable term will therefore
put both parties in a worse'position. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 252 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal,18 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 313-14 (1975); Schwartz, supranote 58, at 233-34.
60. See infra Part VI.
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planation for its steadfast insistence that there be an equity of redemption in every commercial transaction.

HI. MARKET FAILURE AND MORTGAGOR PROTECTIONS
It is often suggested that in a competitive marketplace with no
6
market failures, restrictions on freedom of contract are inefficient. '
This is the basis for numerous critiques of regulation, whether judicial, legislative, or administrative. The corollary also provides a primary justification for legal interventions in the market: when the
marketplace is not competitive or there are systematic market failures, regulation can enhance efficiency. 62 Thus, it is not surprising
that mortgagor protections are subject to criticism as inefficient interventions in the market, or that the primary justifications for them are
drafted in terms of market failure.
On the most basic level, it is easy to understand the arguments
against mortgagor protections and the adverse effects they may have
on both borrowers and lenders. The lender may be required to incur
substantial cost and delay in seeking to enforce its rights, reducing
the ultimate recovery to the lender on a defaulted loan. Lenders will
have to pass these increased losses through to borrowers by raising
the cost of mortgage loans. Further, if borrowers have extensive
protections, it becomes relatively easy for the borrower to increase the
costs to the lender through various methods of objection and delay.
This opportunity to force a greater loss on the lender creates a moral
hazard problem. Borrowers, aware that lenders' remedies are of
limited efficacy, may be more likely to default or to attempt to compel
the lender to agree to a loan modification or renegotiation.
The Article 9 literature discloses another way in which mortgagor protections may have adverse effects, both in terms of efficiency

61. See Eric L. Talley, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated
DamagesRule, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1195, 1195 (1994) ("[Aln oft-recited theme in the law and economics literature is that when individuals act rationally, and transaction costs are negligible,
restrictions on contractual freedom cannot enhance economic efficiency."); cf POSNER, supra
note 58, at 284-87 (discussing whether moral objections to efficiency are well-founded).
62. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 58, at 401-03 (comparing and contrasting the "two
methods of public control"-the common law and administrative regulation); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with
the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction,70 VA. L.
REV. 1083, 1214-17 (1984) (discussing various market failures as justifications for intervention
in the residential mortgage market). For a more general discussion of institutional choice and
law as a cure for market failure, see Neil K. Komesar, Exploringthe Darkness: Law, Economics,
and InstitutionalChoice, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 465.
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and equity-mortgagor protections may destroy an important
mechanism that borrowers use to signal their creditworthiness. As
Professor Scott has pointed out, if borrowers have better information
about their likelihood of default than lenders can easily determine,
penalty clauses may play an important role in securing loans for
marginal borrowers.6 3 Assume a lender wants to determine whether a
borrower is a "good" borrower (less likely to default) or a "bad" borrower (more likely to default). Further, imagine that borrowers know
which type they are, but good borrowers have difficulty finding a clear
way to communicate their quality to the lender in a way that bad borrowers cannot copy. One way to provide this information is to agree
to pay a penalty of some kind upon default. A bad borrower, knowing
that default is likely, is unlikely to agree to such a penalty, but a good
borrower, knowing default is not likely, will agree. Thus, the ability
to offer the creditor harsh and effective remedies upon default may
help lenders distinguish between more and less creditworthy borrowers and so make credit more available to worthy but marginal borrowers. 64
For these reasons,6 5 mortgagor protections have been harshly
criticized as an unwarranted interference in the market, whose costs
lack corresponding benefits. 66 By increasing lender losses upon de63. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principlesof RelationalContracts,67 VA.
L. REv. 1089, 1131 (1981); Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor
Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 730, 741-56 (1989).
64. As Professor Scott pointed out, the "lost value" problem can in fact help this process to
function. See Scott, supra note 63, at 730-32. The criticism of foreclosure on many items of
personalty (particularly household goods) is that the lost value is extreme: this type of collateral is of great value to the borrower, who is using it, but has very little market value or value
to the lender. See id. at 756-59. Thus, foreclosure on such assets deprives the borrower of
valuable assets while realizing little or nothing for the lender. See id. at 758. In other words,
foreclosure is punitive rather than remedial. See id. As Scott argues, however, this can be an
important element in making the credit system function. See id. at 787-88. If the collateral is
valuable, then the lender may have an incentive to induce breach (or an incentive not to work
with a defaulting borrower who needs a renegotiation or other temporary accommodation) in
order to obtain the collateral. See id. at 764-65. If the collateral is of little value to the lender,
the lender will not induce breach; yet if it has value for the borrower, then it will be effective in
deterring "bad" borrowers from seeking credit. See id. at 746-49. Scott's article provided an
important counterpoint to the extensive Article 9 literature that identified the "lost value"
problem as a major flaw in personal property financing, without recognizing the vital purposes
that penalty provisions can serve. For a related point in the commercial context, see Triantis,
supranote 12, at 246-47.
65. Of course, these are not the only grounds upon which such provisions have been attacked. Most recently, mortgagor protections have been criticized for contributing to the erosion
of personal responsibility in our society. See James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal
Responsibility: A Different View of MortgageeAntideficiency and Redemption Statutes, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 117, 120 (1997).
66. See, e.g., David J. Dietrich, The Montana Judicialand Non-JudicialForeclosureSale:
Analysis and Suggestions for Reform, 49 MONT. L. REv. 285, 322 (1988) (redemption statutes in-
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fault, mortgagor protections force lenders to raise the interest rates
they charge.67 These higher rates not only make mortgages more expensive for all borrowers, but they have a disproportionate impact on
marginal borrowers, both because they can least afford the increase
and because lenders will be less willing to lend to marginal borrowers
(and so will tighten credit standards).
But mortgagor protections also have their defenders. Michael
Schill has provided the most thorough justification of mortgagor protection laws, at least as applied to consumers, arguing that they correct some basic market failures.68 Schill draws the following distinction between the equity of redemption (which the courts regulate) and
other financing terms (which the courts do not regulate): borrowers
are able to evaluate the latter with reasonable accuracy, but systematically misvalue the former. 69 In Schill's analysis, mandatory
mortgagor protections are a form of compulsory insurance, imposing a
slightly higher interest rate on each borrower in exchange for
additional protections should circumstances disable the borrower
from performing according to the mortgage loan agreement.70 While

crease cost of credit); George M. Platt, Deficiency Judgments in Oregon Loans Secured by Land:
Growing Disparity Among Functional Equivalents, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 37, 49 (1987)
(arguing that 'the debtor's statutory right to redeem is chimerical" and that it succeeds only in
lengthening the foreclosure proceeding and increasing lender costs); Tefft, supra note 21, at 590,
596 (stating that "[s]tatutory rights of redemption should be abolished; they operate to
discourage bidding"). See generally Terrence M. Clauretie, State Foreclosure Laws, Risk
Shifting, and the Private Mortgage Insurance Industry, 56 J. RISK & INS. 544, 544-52 (1989)
(showing that laws favoring borrowers increase mortgagee costs).
67. For estimates of the amount of this effect, see Terrence Clauretie, The Impact of
Interstate Foreclosure Cost Differences and the Value of Mortgages on Default Rates, 15 Am.
REAL EST. & URB. ECON. A. J. 152 (1987); Mark Meador, The Effects of MortgageLaws on Home
MortgageRates, 34 J. ECON. & Bus. 143, 146-47 (1982); Schill, supranote 29, at 496-97.
68 See Schill, supra note 29, at 498-500.
69. See id. at 491, 500. In justifying borrower protections as remedies for consumers'
cognitive limitations, Schill is part of an extensive literature. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 8
(defending "fairness" as a standard of enforcing proper terms in consumer transactions where
market failures prevent consumers from protecting themselves); Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and
Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983) (exploring the need to protect consumers based on
imperfect information); Norman I. Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers: Cognitive
Psychology, Consumer Behavior and Consumer Law, 2 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 69 (1990)
(examining the psychological evidence for consumers' inability to act as rational maximizers).
As Scott has written, "at bottom, all attempts to justify current regulation [of consumer credit
transactions] rest on the evidence that individual debtors make systematic cognitive errors and
are vulnerable to impulsive behavior." Scott, supranote 63, at 766.
70. See Schill, supra note 29, at 495-500. A similar argument is made by Charles Kahn &
Abdullah Yavas, who expanded the concept of mortgagor protection as insurance for risk-averse
mortgagors. See Charles M. Kahn & Abdullah Yavas, The Economic Role of Foreclosures,8 J.
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 35, 45-46 (1994). The ability to renegotiate upon default, and the
bank's incentive to do so (where it values the collateral less than does the borrower) is insurance
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such insurance could be offered by the marketplace, Schill demonstrates that consumers may have systematic cognitive limitations
that prevent them from adequately valuing this insurance. In other
words, because consumers underestimate the likelihood of various
misfortunes that could lead them to default (unemployment, health
problems, and so forth), they would refuse to purchase mortgage insurance against these risks even if it were offered on actuarially advantageous terms. Given these cognitive failures, mandatory insurance through mortgagor protection laws can be justified as a reason71
able correction for a malfunctioning market.
The argument that mortgagor protections are intended to
shield borrowers from the effects of their own undue optimism is reflected elsewhere in the traditional literature.7 2 But while such cognitive limitations are plausible, indeed likely, in consumer markets,
they are less convincing as an explanation for intervention in commercial mortgage transactions. We generally expect commercial entities to be able to gauge risk effectively, and, at the very least, there
is good reason to be skeptical of claims that mandatory and inflexible
legal rules will systematically outperform commercial parties in
measuring and allocating risk. Schill specifically notes that his model
of market failure is unpersuasive as applied to commercial actors and

for the borrower. When the legislature imposes a mandatory protection, it increases the
insurance aspect, which will benefit very risk-averse borrowers.
71. Obviously, these protections could go too far, offering greater protections than even informed, risk-averse borrowers would choose. In the extreme, we might expect to see other
mechanisms substituted for mortgage loans. This appears to be happening in France, where
foreclosure takes at least three years-and even longer if the borrower engages in delaying
tactics. The inefficiency of mortgage law, combined with the costs of recording a mortgage, have
resulted in the rise of unsecured loans to purchase homes, backed by a surety company that
charges the borrower a fee for issuing the guaranty. Upon default, the surety pays the lender,
and then may pursue its remedies against the borrower. For a fuller description, see Charles
Austin Stone & Anne Zissu, Le Pret Immobilier Cautionne: An Innovative Substitute for the
FrenchMortgage, 3 J. HOUSING RES. 401, 401-06 (1992).
72. [R]elief will be granted where there has been a misreliance upon the "mirage of
hope." Ordinarily the courts have talked in terms of granting relief because of solicitude
for the "impecunious landowner" or "necessitous men [who] are not, truly speaking, free
men." But another most important factor is in the mortgagee playing upon the
optimism to which all mankind is prone, the "over-confidence in one's own capacities and
faith in a special providence [which] leads us to over-sanguine commitments." Equity
takes this human failing into account.
GEORGE E. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 147 (2d ed. 1970) (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. f (1997) (noting that "subsequent executory

agreements are not.., shielded from the clogging doctrine"); McGovern, supra note 57, at 143,
147-48 (discussing the historical trends of relief for mortgagors and mortgagees).
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suggests that mortgagor protection laws should not cover commercial
73
borrowers.
External effects are another category of market failures that
often justify legal intervention in the market. If mortgage defaults
have negative effects on parties other than the lender and borrower,
which the lender and borrower do not take into account in their dealings, then public regulation to mitigate these externalities may be
justified. 74 Certainly, externality arguments have been used to justify
some mortgagor protection laws, particularly in periods of widespread
economic failure. 75 However, it is difficult to see the particular external effects .that warrant singling out commercial mortgage relationships from other financial contracts, 76 and there do not appear to be
any comprehensive or persuasive attempts to justify commercial
mortgagor protections on the basis of externalities. 77
A related justification for mandatory mortgage law may arise
from the efficiencies of standardized contracting. 78 It may be that
lenders and borrowers could maximize the net benefits of their contractual relationships through individually crafted loan documents.
However, lenders and borrowers as a group may face lower costs if
73. See Schill, supra note 29, at 533-34; see also Greg Weselka, Note, Real Property
Deficiency Judgments-Texas Enacts Fair Market Value Statutes, 23 TEX TECH. L. REV. 871,
905-06 (1992) (arguing that commercial mortgagors do not need anti-deficiency protection
because they can bargain at arm's length).
74. See Eric Posner, ContractLaw in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconsionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
283, 285 (1995) (arguing that some mandatory protections are justified to prevent undue risktaking by persons protected by the welfare state).
75. See, e.g., Samuel R. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A
HistoricalStudy of Contract Clause Jurisprudence,72 OR. L. REV. 513, 576-77 (1993) (noting
appellee's argument in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934),
that mortgage mortatoria were valid exercises of the police power that did not violate the
Contracts Clause because rampant foreclosure sales caused real estate depreciation that
prolonged the depression and led to civil unrest).
76. Externality arguments have been used to justify other restrictions on contractual
freedom in the commercial context. See, e.g., Paul Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty
Clauses and Specific Performance,10 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 239-41 (1981) (arguing that penalty
clauses in contracts typically are not enforced in order to prevent commercial parties from externalizing the cost of dispute resolution by using publicly-funded courts).
77. This obviously relates to the extensive debate about the effects of secured credit on
noncontractual creditors, such as tort claimants. Some have argued that a primary function of
secured credit is to externalize costs of business failures onto noncontractual creditors, to the
benefit of sophisticated contractual creditors and shareholders. For further discussion of this
argument, see Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory,
Practice and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 335-37 & n.167 (1997). However, there does not
appear to be any attempt to tie these concerns to the structure of real property mortgage law.
78. This explanation has been advanced as a potential justification for mandatory corporate law. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structureof CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1549, 1567-69 (1989) (discussing the need for a mandatory uniform legal regime to maintain the
public good of a standard corporate form).
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their rights and obligations are clearly defined. If each mortgage
agreement is unique, there will be less judicial precedent on point in
any particular dispute and less certainty about the parties' entitlements. Thus, the mortgage finance system may function most efficiently overall if borrowers and lenders have mandatory, predefined
rights, even if any particular loan might have been more efficiently
structured by individualized negotiations between the parties. This
justification, however, does not explain what is special about mortgage law. It is hard to see why mortgages require a more standardized framework than other areas of commercial contracting.
Of course, there are justifications for consumer protection law
apart from market failures such as externalities and imperfect information. For example, Anthony Kronman has justified contract regulation on paternalistic grounds, seeing a role for government in
preserving individual liberty and welfare. 7s In the commercial
context, however, these autonomy and welfare concerns carry much
less weight because we have little concern for the autonomy and
welfare of commercial entities. Rather, contractual freedom of
commercial entities is an instrumental goal, desirable because and to
the extent it furthers other ends-primarily the goal of economic
efficiency.80
Another set of justifications for mortgagor protections in the
consumer context can be found in the importance or sanctity of the
homestead. As Margaret Radin has written, people become emotionally attached to their homes, so that their sense of well-being may
become closely linked with the preservation of the home.81 Indeed,
residences are accorded a special place in many areas of our legal system, ranging from the home mortgage income tax deduction to bankruptcy exemptions. Mortgagor protections can also be defended in
terms of fairness 82 or distributional equity.m But whatever the merits
79. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763
(1983). But see Scott, supra note 63, at 776-82 (responding to Kronman and rejecting
paternalistic and distributional arguments against self-enforcing creditor remedies).
80. I do not mean to suggest that this is the only relevant goal to consider. Contractual
freedom may also further other interests, such as the dispersion of power throughout society as
a bulwark against government oppression, and the freedom of commercial entities may also be
instrumental in securing liberty for natural persons, who use these entities to further personal
goals.
81. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991-1002
(1982) (discussing how the "personhood perspective" in relation to the home is "implicit in our
law").
82. See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR INTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 128 (1960) (discussing
the equity of redemption in terms of unconscionability); McGovern, supra note 57, at 143-44
(discussing historical notions of fairness in the creditor-debtor relationship).
83. See Schill, supra note 29, at 490 n.4.
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of these arguments in the consumer context, they are suspect as
justifications for mandatory borrower protections in financing
agreements between sophisticated commercial entities.
As one would expect given the obvious limitations of these rationales, the law has often recognized that commercial borrowers are
in need of less protection than consumer borrowers.8 This tendency
is present in mortgage law to some extent, yet the differentiation
between consumer and business mortgagors is still rather limited in
most jurisdictions.8 Many mortgagor protections-the equity of redemption, anti-deficiency statutes, one-action rules, and so
forth-apply to both consumer and commercial mortgagors. Some
statutes limit their protections to residential borrowers and some
courts have indicated a greater willingness to permit commercial borrowers to waive the equity of redemption in workout situations subject to strict judicial review of the fairness of the transaction.87 But
the fact of judicial scrutiny is itself surprising-in how many other
contexts do courts insist on scrutinizing commercial transactions before granting them a presumption of enforceability?
Absent the identification of a market failure, or of some value
that trumps efficiency concerns in this context, it is difficult to justify
the imposition of mandatory protections for commercial mortgagors.
To put the question bluntly, if Donald Trump agrees to waive the
equity of redemption in order to secure a mortgage loan from a
syndicate of money center banks, why should the law interfere? Thus
we face a question that lies at the heart of the law of mortgages (of
both real property and personalty): Is there any reason why the equity of redemption cannot be waived, or is this a mere historical artifact, an irrationality in the largely rational body of the common law?

84. In fact, it is easy to compile a list of legal protections for consumers that are not extended to commercial actors. Examples where consumer protections are generally not available
to commercial parties include usury statutes, the Truth in Lending Act, and the unconscionability doctrine generally.
85. See, e.g., Palcar Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 210, 211-12 (8th Cir. 1942)
(holding that commercial mortgagor may waive the statutory right of redemption in the initial
mortgage).
86. Residential mortgagees often have greater protections in fact, even if the law applicable to residential mortgagees and commercial mortgagees is identical, because the standardized
forms used for most residential mortgages, at the behest of the Federal National Mortgage
Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and the Government National
Mortgage Association, are drafted to be relatively pro-consumer. See Curtis J. Berger, ULSLA
and the ProtectedParty: Evolution orRevolution?, 24 CoNN. L. REv. 971, 974 (1992).
87. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE FUNCTIONS OF MORTGAGE LAW

It has often been suggested that the common law has a tendency to adopt economically efficient rules.8 If this is so, then it
seems likely that a rule as universally followed as the immutability of
the equity of redemption is economically efficient. It is not hard to
suggest reasons why the equity of redemption, or various other mortgagor protections, may be efficient in the majority of mortgage relationships. 89 But even if the equity of redemption benefits most
parties, is there any reason to require it, rather than letting parties
negotiate the term for themselves? This question takes on added
weight when one considers the downside of the equity of redemption:
it typically results in an added layer of delay and litigation expense
upon default. One can easily imagine settings in which the equity of
redemption might appear to be a desirable mortgage term and
settings in which it might not. The puzzle, then, is why the term is a
mandatory element of the mortgage relationship rather than a
negotiable default rule.
The analysis below suggests that the equity of redemption may
in fact be efficient, helping the parties to create appropriate incentives for renegotiation upon default90 Moreover, it may be difficult or
impossible for the parties to negotiate such a provision even though it
is efficient because of signalling problems present in the loan origination process. 91 Ultimately, an understanding of this problem may help
to find the grain of sense in the seemingly irrational judicial incantations of unequal bargaining power as the justification for the equity of
redemption. 92
A. The Mortgage Context
To understand the role of the equity of redemption, we must
start with its obvious effects. The equity of redemption generally increases the amount of time it takes for the lender to enforce its rights
88. See, e.g., John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law,
7 J. LEGAL STuD. 393, 393 (1978). But see E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in
Jurisprudence,85 COLUM. L. REV. 38, 62-72 (1985) (discussing economic models of efficient legal

evolution in the context of other evolutionary theories of law); Gillian M. Hadfield, Positive
PoliticalTheory and Public Law: Bias in the Evolution ofLegal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 583-86
(1992) (disputing efficiency of the common law).
89. They may create efficient incentives for breach, allocate bargaining power in an effi-

cient manner, or be a desirable means of dividing risks among the parties.
90.
91.
92.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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and increases the costs incurred by the lender in enforcing its rights.
Can delay and increased enforcement costs be good things?
At this point, a few factors pertinent to real estate lending
should be discussed. First, commercial real estate is relatively ilhiquid, and converting property value to cash can be expensive and time
consuming. Thus, it is not uncommon for a borrower with equity to
have difficulty in making its mortgage payments. Moreover, the high
costs of transferring interests in real property make the risk of lost
value a real one should the lender speedily foreclose on the collateral.
This risk is complicated by the difficulty of valuing commercial property, another facet of an illiquid market.
Second, commercial mortgage loans may go into default for any
of a host of reasons pertaining to the overall state of the economy or
local real estate market, bankruptcy or default of a tenant, the abilities or honesty of the owner or manager, natural catastrophes, or
myriad other factors. While the parties may form opinions as to the
cause or causes of any particular default, these are often subject to
debate and may be expensive and difficult for a court to determine
accurately.
Finally, consider a typical mortgage loan scenario: the lender
has largely performed its contract by funding the loan and its obligations thereafter are ancillary at most. There is little opportunity for
the lender to default once the loan is advanced. While discussions of
foreclosure law often ascribe the position of "power" to the lender, in a
very real sense the borrower has the power: the borrower has received the lender's full performance and the lender is at risk for repayment. The result, not surprisingly, is an effort to create mechanisms that will ensure good faith performance by the borrower.
With these factors in mind, it becomes clear that a properly
structured mortgage agreement must accomplish at least three distinct objectives. First, it should permit efficient screening or signalling in the mortgage loan market, so that appropriate loan decisions
are made. Second, it should provide incentives for efficient behavior
by the lender and borrower during the life of the loan. Third, it
should provide incentives for efficient enforcement or renegotiation
should the loan go into default. The question of signalling or screening is addressed in Part VI. The creation of efficient incentives during
the life of the loan, and for renegotiation upon default, are the subjects of the sections immediately below.

622

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:599

B. Efficient Incentives During the Life of the Loan
The lender, having fully performed its obligations by advancing
the loan proceeds, will insist on protections to maximize the probability that the borrower will be willing and able to repay the loan as it
comes due. A mortgage prevents misbehavior by the borrower in two
primary ways. First, by giving the lender a property interest in the
collateral, the mortgage prevents the borrower from entering into
certain transactions with other parties (subsequent lenders or
93
purchasers) that would be inconsistent with the lender's interest.
Second, it provides that certain types of misbehavior will give the
lender the right to accelerate the loan and, if the borrower does not
redeem the collateral by repaying the debt in full, foreclose.9 In these
ways, the mortgage gives the lender leverage to induce the borrower
to perform its contractual obligations, and also provides the remedy of
foreclosure for the lender should the borrower nonetheless breach.
Inducing performance by the borrower and increasing the
assets available to the secured creditor are not the only functions of a
security interest, however. In thinking about the loan relationship, it
is worth considering what the parties would consider full, good faith
performance. It could mean the enforcement of the written contract
according to its terms, but the parties would probably want more than
that. They would also like to know that, should problems develop in
the future, they would each engage in good faith negotiations to
maximize their joint profits.
If an efficient renegotiation is possible, yet the parties fail to
reach it, there are both public and private costs. The parties suffer
from the failure to maximize the value of their joint undertaking. The
public also suffers as the parties move their dispute resolution process
from the realm of private negotiations, in which the parties bear all of
the costs, to the courts, which are subsidized by public funds.95 A
system of law that encourages effective renegotiation is therefore a
benefit not only for the parties but also for the courts and taxpayers.
Thus, a well-crafted security arrangement should serve a
function that has gone relatively unnoted in the legal literature: it
should provide a structure that encourages the lender and borrower to

93. See, e.g., Triantis, supra note 12, at 247 (noting that security interests impair the
future marketability of collateral).

94. See, e.g., id. at 245-49 (discussing value of security interest for maximizing
enforcement efficiency).
95. For an elaboration of this argument in the context of liquidated-damages provisions,
see Rubin, supra note 76, at 238.
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renegotiate the loan if renegotiation is efficient. Further, an efficient
security arrangement would do this without creating opportunities for
the parties to compel inefficient renegotiations or otherwise act opportunistically during the loan term. The following sections explore the
role of mortgage law in fostering efficient renegotiation.
C. Efficient Renegotiation upon Default
1. The Benefits of Renegotiation
If the borrower defaults, the parties may resort to their legal
rights and remedies: the lender may choose to enforce its contractual
and security rights, and the borrower may decide whether to redeem
the collateral by paying the mortgage debt. However, in many
situations it may be better for the borrower and lender to enter into a
renegotiated credit arrangement. If this appears to be the case, the
parties presumably would prefer to engage in good faith negotiations
to secure a workout agreement. Yet, for a number of reasons, they
may find themselves unable to reach an efficient renegotiation even if
one is available.
To understand the renegotiation problem, we must begin with
a quick review of the literature on fully contingent contracts.
Whenever contractual performance extends over a period of time, the
initial allocation of rights may be rendered inefficient by changing
circumstances.9 6 An ideal contract would provide the optimal rights
and remedies for each party, for each possible future state of the
world. 97 However, such a contract, often referred to as "fully statecontingent," is not only impossible to achieve (because it would take
perfect foresight and drafting), 98 but would require the parties to
negotiate and draft myriad provisions pertaining to extremely
improbable events, incurring unjustified transaction costs. 99 Given
the limits of human foresight and other costs of negotiating a fully
specified contract, contracts are always incompletely statecontingent. 00

96.

See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationshipsand the Selection of Default Rules

for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 535, 535-36 (1990); Scott, supranote 13, at 603-05.
97. See Talley, supra note 61, at 1206 n.48 (noting that a "completely contingent
contract.., is more of a theoretical construct than an empirical reality").
98. See id. at 1206 (stating that "completely contingent contracts are unfeasible").
99. See id.
100. A contract may be "obligationally complete," meaning that it sets forth each party's
rights and obligations under every future state of the world (such as "I have given you the car
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Even if a fully specified contract could be drafted, its efficacy
would be limited by the costs and errors of enforcement-in particular, courts may be unable to accurately and inexpensively determine
the precise meaning of the agreement 1 and each of the factors relevant to carrying out the specified bargain. As Gur Huberman and
Charles Kahn have shown, when the costs of drafting a complete
contract are combined with these limits on contract enforcement, it
may be optimal for the parties to leave various contingencies
untreated in the initial contract in the expectation that, should those
contingencies arise, the relationship will be renegotiated. 10 2 If the
parties take this route, then they may prefer not to draft the initial
contract to provide for their best guess as to the outcome of the
renegotiation; rather, they may want the initial contract to
incorporate those terms that will be most conducive to a successful
renegotiation should the relevant contingencies in fact come to pass. 103
To be more specific, a mortgage default is not only the setting
for a possible foreclosure proceeding, but the occasion for negotiations
regarding a restructuring of the loan obligation. Under various scenarios, it may make sense for the lender to agree to forbear on its
remedies and renegotiate the borrower's repayment obligations. For
example, if the loan default is caused by temporary conditions that
the lender and borrower both expect to pass quickly, and if foreclosure
entails substantial cost, both sides may gain by agreeing to interim
and you will pay me $5,000 tomorrow"). Yet an obligationally complete contract is not necessar-

ily complete in the sense of being optimally state-contingent-that is, it may not provide the optimal rights and remedies for every future state of the world. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Strategic ContractualInefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730
(1992).
101. For a similar point in a different context, see THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James

Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), which states: "All new laws, though penned with the
greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered
as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a
series of particular discussions and adjudications."
102. See Gur Huberman & Charles Kahn, Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic
Renegotiation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 471, 471 (1988) [hereinafter, Huberman & Kahn, Limited
Contract Enforcement]; Charles Kahn & Gur Huberman, Default, Foreclosure and Strategic
Renegotiation, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 51 (1989) [hereinafter, Kahn & Huberman,
Default].
103. Kahn and Huberman write that:
[O]ur approach emphasizes that property rights may be assigned initially on a strategic
basis. In some circumstances it is desirable to assign property not to the party who has

the greatest ultimate use for the property, but to the party who should be endowed with
bargaining power in subsequent periods. While a lender typically has less use for the
secured property than does a borrower, a security contract assigns the property right to
the lender in case of default in order to give the lender the power to extract as much

value as possible when default occurs.
Kahn & Huberman, Default, supra note 102, at 61.
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relief such as a temporary payment moratorium. Or suppose the borrower has specialized knowledge or abilities relating to the collateral,
so that the property is worth more to the borrower than to the lender
or to third parties. 1°4 A renegotiation in which the borrower retains
control of and an interest in the property may be value-maximizing
for both borrower and lender. In other cases, the optimal result may
follow from enforcement of the original mortgage terms without
renegotiation. For example, if the default was caused by the dishonesty or incompetence of the borrower, foreclosure may maximize the
value of the asset. Moreover, the threat of foreclosure rather than
renegotiation when the borrower is at fault may provide an important
incentive for borrowers to be careful and honest. 0 5
If contracting were costless and courts could easily and accurately determine the causes of default, the intentions and abilities of
the borrower and lender, and all other factors relevant to the renegotiation decision, then the parties could specify in the initial contract
what should happen to the collateral under each possible default scenario. The court would determine which default scenario had occurred and then impose the efficient resolution on the parties, all as
specified in the initial contract. However, given that such a detailed
and prescient contract is impossible, the lender and borrower may
maximize their joint benefits by leaving many specific default scenarios untreated in the initial contract-if they can renegotiate upon default.
At first blush, this renegotiation might appear a fairly easy
matter. If transaction costs are low, the legal entitlements of the
parties upon default (including the legal rules governing foreclosure)

104. See Mann, Explaining, supra note 21, at 647 n.79 (listing factors that can cause a
debtor to value collateral at more than market value); Mann, Strategy, supra note 21, at 202
(explaining why real estate lender prefers to leave many defaulting borrowers in possession of
the collateral). In general, we can expect collateral to be worth more in the hands of the

borrower than the lender, because lenders are usually not efficient managers of the types of
assets that are assigned as collateral. See Helmut Bester, The Role of Collateralin a Model of
Debt Renegotiation, 26 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 72, 73 (1994) (noting that creditors are less
efficient as managers of a project's assets than debtors); Huberman & Kahn, Limited Contract

Enforcement, supra note 102, at 471 (discussing lendor inefficiency as a rationale for contract
renegotiation).
105. See Huberman & Kahn, Limited ContractEnforcement, supra note 102, at 480:
The threat of taking over the borrower's assets is useful in inducing types of behavior
that the bank desires (for example, prudent investment policies), but which it would be
difficult for a court to verify. If default does occur, the inferior clause, having served its
purpose, can be renegotiated away.
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might affect the allocation of benefits between them,e1° but would not
prevent an efficient outcome. 107 The lender and borrower would arrive
at a renegotiated loan if this maximized their joint returns. But loan
workouts are not low transaction cost settings. Not only is it costly to
draft and enforce contracts, but several additional types of transaction costs affect the renegotiation: the workout situation is a bilateral
monopoly with asymmetric information.1'8 Moreover, the possibility
of renegotiation may itself create incentives for opportunistic behavior
by the parties. 10 9 Given these problems, the parties will want the initial mortgage agreement to incorporate incentives to conduct renegotiations efficiently. It is in the context of this high-transaction-cost
renegotiation that the economic justification for the equity of redemption appears.
2. Barriers to Renegotiation
The first obstacle to renegotiation is the existence of a bilateral
monopoly.110 In the workout situation, the borrower and lender each
face constraints on their ability to exit the relationship. To the extent
that the borrower and lender are locked into dealing with each other,
they can be expected to engage in difficult and time-consuming negotiations, as each party attempts to garner a greater share of the
benefits available from a renegotiation."'
The bilateral monopoly problem is compounded by the presence of private information. To take the simplest example, a party
will generally be unwilling to communicate to the other side the value
it places on a potential contract, because that disclosure would enable
the other side to set its price at the highest level to which the first

106. This would affect the initial pricing of the loan, but not the disposition of the collateral
upon default.
107. This is a straightforward application of the Coase theorem. See generally Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
108. In an analogous situation, Talley analyzed the enforceability of liquidated damages
provisions as a situation of renegotiating a bilateral monopoly with asymmetric information.
See generally Talley, supra note 61.
109. See infra Part IV.C.3.
110. A bilateral monopoly arises when parties have no choice but to negotiate with each
other, and so neither party faces the constraint of competition in conducting its negotiations.
See POSNER, supra note 58, at 68-69 (discussing bilateral monopolies in the context of
transaction costs).
111. Cf Talley, supra note 61, at 1198 (referring to this situation as a "bilateral
monopoly").
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information can pose a
party would agree.112 The presence of private
1 13
significant barrier to successful negotiations.
In the mortgage default context, the fundamental, though certainly not the only, informational asymmetry appears in each party's
knowledge of the other's perceived valuation of the collateral. Given
the illiquid nature of commercial real estate markets, property valuation is subjective even in the best of cases, a problem compounded by
the specifics of the borrower's and lender's situations.1 14 A borrower
may value a property at more than "market value" because of ego
considerations, because the borrower can manage or develop the
property more efficiently than others due to knowledge developed in
working with the property,1 5 and so on. Conversely, the lender may
or may not be willing to foreclose on the property depending on its
evaluation of the market for the property, its internal management
skills, or its regulatory and accounting needs."16 These internal valuations and considerations are not apparent to the other side in the
negotiations, nor can they easily be communicated in a credible fashion.
Where one party (say, the lender) has market power, and the
other (say, the developer) has private information, the result may be
inefficient contracting. 117 The developer may desire special terms, but
can only justify those desires by disclosing the value of the project.
Yet, if the developer discloses how valuable the project is and the
lender has market power, the lender will use that market power to
extract additional profits from the developer. Therefore, the developer may prefer not to disclose, so as not to share excess profits, and

112. This is strictly true only where the second party has some market power; if the market
is fully competitive and contracting is costless, the second party will only be able to extract the
market price regardless of its knowledge.
113. See Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic
Analysis of Good Faithand the ContractModification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 335,
340-50 (1993) [hereinafter Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles] (discussing
inefficiencies resulting from incomplete information); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic
Bargainingand the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 631-36
(1990) [hereinafter Johnston, Strategic Bargaining](showing how strategic bargaining concerns
can prevent parties from disclosing information that is needed for the parties to arrive at an
efficient contract).
114. Cf. Shupack, supra note 7, at 1092 (noting that different creditors may value even
readily marketable collateral differently, depending on the costs they would face in foreclosure
or repossession, and disposition).
115. See Mann, Strategy, supra note 21, at 204-05 (discussing borrowers' expertise as a
factor in workouts).
116. See Marshall E. Tracht, Workouts, Foreclosure,and Bankruptcy, Chapter 11, in ALVIN
ARNOLD, REAL EsTAT INVESTOR'S DESKBoOK I 11.04[4][b] (3d ed. 1994).

117. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 94.
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instead accept less efficient contract terms to keep a larger share of
the profits.
Market power may be relatively rare in U.S. lending markets,
which are quite competitive. However, relational contracting models
suggest that one purpose of secured financing may be to lock the borrower into a relationship with the lender, ensuring the lender that it
will reap the rewards of investing time and money in its lending relationship with the borrower." 8 In other words, the point of relational
contracting is that the parties may agree to give each other monopoly
power to avoid other inefficiencies. But to the extent that the mortgagee and mortgagor develop a relationship that makes them more
efficient contracting partners than the alternatives, they each have a
greater stake in keeping the relationship alive-and this makes each
party vulnerable to strategic or opportunistic behavior by the other. 119
Thus, parties to a relational financing contract may create a situation
where, after default, they are negotiating in a situation of asymmetric
information and market power, and renegotiation is therefore difficult
and contentious. 12 0
3. The Problem of Opportunistic Renegotiation
Moreover, the possibility of renegotiation may itself create
problems, as parties become tempted to threaten default in order to
extract improved terms from the other side. 121 If courts are unable to
provide a perfect remedy for breach, then a promisor may find it advantageous to breach a contract where the net costs of performing
exceed the expected damages that would be awarded by a court.

22

If

the promisee is aware of the costs and benefits of performance to the
promisor, then the promisee will know whether the promisor's threat
of breach is real. If it is, the parties can renegotiate the contract; if
not, the promisee will refuse to renegotiate. Thus, if the promisee

118. Cf Goetz & Scott, supra note 63, at 1092-95 (discussing rationales for entering into
relational contracts).
119. See, e.g., id. at 1101 (noting relational contracting vulnerability to strategic or opportunistic behavior).
120. Even if the mortgage relationship is not properly viewed as a relational contract, the
fixed costs of refinancing may be large enough to give the lender market power vis-A-vis the borrower.
121. For more detailed analyses of this problem, see generally Daniel A. Graham & Ellen
R. Peirce, Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the Hold-Up Game, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989); Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles, supra note 113;
William P. Rogerson, ContractualSolutions to the Hold-Up Problem, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 777
(1992); Scott, supranote 13, at 612-15.
122. See Johnston, DefaultRules/MandatoryPrinciples,supra note 113, at 344-45.
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knows what it will cost the promisor to perform, the promisor cannot
extract a compromise by falsely claiming a willingness to breach the
contract. Similarly, if the court can award perfect damages, the
promisee has no reason to compromise its rights when the promisor
threatens to breach. Nor will the promisee compromise if the promisee can secure substitute performance in the market.
Under more realistic assumptions, however, a party may
threaten breach to secure an opportunistic renegotiation. If the
promisee cannot verify the promisor's costs and benefits of performance, and cannot get full compensation or substituted performance if
the promisor breaches, the promisor may threaten breach even when
The promisee, not
it would rather perform than pay damages. 1'
knowing whether the promisor will carry out its threat, may compromise rather than risk the losses it would suffer from the promisor's breach. Knowing that the promisee may fold under such a bluff,
the promisor has an incentive to threaten breach even when it would
rather perform the contract than pay damages-that is, when performance of the contract is efficient. This dynamic results in unnecessary costs as parties renegotiate efficient contracts, and risks inefficient deadlocks where the renegotiation fails.
In the mortgage context, the renegotiation scenario typically
arises when the borrower defaults or threatens to default on the
mortgage debt. The lender may be unsure whether the borrower is
unable to repay the loan, or can in fact repay the loan but is defaulting in order to secure concessions from the lender.'2 If the borrower
cannot repay the debt, it is possible that it is in the joint interest of
the borrower and lender to restructure the debt. But the lender will
be reluctant to agree to a restructuring if it cannot verify that the
borrower actually needs these concessions and is not just bluffing in
an attempt to obtain improved loan terms. Moreover, the lender may
have a strategic reason for refusing to renegotiate where it is unclear
whether the borrower's threat of default is genuine or opportunistic:
By developing a reputation for toughness, the lender may reduce the
likelihood that other borrowers will make opportunistic threats of default. Thus, there is a reason to believe that lenders might prefer to
err against renegotiating with borrowers, and that efficient renegotiations may not take place.

123. See Bester, supranote 104, at 76; Graham & Peirce, supra note 121, at 9-12; Johnston,
DefaultRules/MandatoryPrinciples,supranote 113, at 345.
124. See Bester, supranote 104, at 73.
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As Professor Johnston points out, even if it were possible,
simply forbidding contract modifications would not be a satisfactory
solution to the risk of opportunistic threats, because circumstances
may in fact have changed the costs or benefits of performance, making
renegotiation the efficient path.'2 The goal, then, is to develop a legal
regime that will discourage opportunistic contract modifications while
encouraging efficient ones.
V. THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION AS AN AID TO RENEGOTIATION
We have identified two related problems. First, the parties
want to be able to renegotiate the mortgage transaction as circum126
stances develop, but these renegotiations face various barriers.
Second, if these barriers are successfully reduced, the increased possibility of renegotiation may create an opportunity for costly strategic
27
bluffing.
The equity of redemption may provide a partial cure for these
twin problems. It reduces the barriers to renegotiation in several
distinct ways. First, it provides the borrower with an exit option,
mitigating the lender's monopoly position. Second, the equity of redemption creates a period of unavoidable delay during which a defaulting borrower has an opportunity to convince the lender that the
claimed reason for its default is genuine. Moreover, it gives the insolvent or illiquid borrower a bargaining chip that may enable it to convince the lender of its bona fides. Finally, it does this without substantially impairing the ability of the lender to impose a loss on a borrower who falsely claims to be unable to repay in the hope of extract128
ing concessions.
Consider a new office building that goes into default because
the lease-up period takes longer than anticipated. If the problem is
caused by exogenous factors, then it may be efficient to renegotiate
the loan to permit the borrower to retain the asset. However, if the
problem is caused by the borrower's lack of management skills, rene125. Barring renegotiation may result in certain types of efficiency. In particular, it would
eliminate the incentive for parties to falsely threaten breach to secure an inefficient redistributive renegotiation. It may also strengthen the value of secured credit as a signalling device. Cf
Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, Incentive-CompatibleDebt Contracts: The One-PeriodProblem,
52 REv. ECON. STuD. 647, 647-49 (1985). Moreover, the parties' inability to commit themselves
not to renegotiate may prevent them from achieving the most efficient contract in the first
place. See Johnston, Default Rules/MandatoryPrinciples,supranote 113, at 348 n.24.
126. See supraParts PV.C.1-2.
127. See supraPart IV.C.3.
128. See Bester, supra note 104, at 77.

19991

EQUITY OFREDEMPTION

631

gotiation may not be efficient. Perhaps the initial loan agreement
could provide that for defaults caused by market conditions the
parties will negotiate in good faith to modify the loan agreement, but
that if the default is caused by the borrower the lender will be entitled
to enforce its remedies. The problems with such a contractual agreement are obvious: determining the cause of the default may be diffi12 9
cult, and judicial determination may be expensive and error-prone.
Moreover, this contractual solution would create incentives for
inefficient strategic behavior by both sides. The borrower knows that
it can force a renegotiation of the agreement if it can persuade a court
that market conditions have forced a default. 13 0 The lender knows
that it can enforce its strict remedies only if it can demonstrate the
fault of the borrower. The outcome will be determined not by the
parties' actual beliefs about the causes of the problem, but by judicial
perceptions of the situation.
Now consider the scenario where the cause of default is irrelevant to the parties' rights, but the lender's remedies are constrained
by the equity of redemption. Should the borrower threaten default,
the lender must decide whether the borrower is honest or bluffingwhich will generally turn on whether the property is worth more or
less to the borrower than the debt that is owed. The borrower may
find it difficult to communicate its subjective valuation credibly, so
the primary problem the parties face is one of communication and
trust.
Given this negotiation problem, the equity of redemption (and
concomitant need to foreclose the mortgage) may facilitate the
workout process. In the terminology introduced by Guido Calabresi
and Douglas Melamed, the equity of redemption does not change the
lender's entitlement to have the value of the collateral applied to its
debt upon default.' 3 ' However, it does change the way in which this
entitlement is protected, substituting a liability rule for a property
rule.3 2 While it has become common to stress the value of clear enti33
tlements, protected by property rules, in reducing transaction costs,
the equity of redemption appears to be an example of a liability rule
129. See supraPart IV.C.
130. See supraPart IV.C.3.
131. A "property rule" is one that is protected by remedies (such as injunctive relief) that
prohibit a nonowner from taking the entitlement without the owner's permission. A "liability
rule" permits a non-owner to take the entitlement upon payment of damages to the owner. See
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, LiabilityRules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972).
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supranote 59, at 100; POSNER, supra note 58, at 273-74.
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that reduces transaction costs in a situation of asymmetric information.134
The equity of redemption requires that a period of time
(determined by the foreclosure procedures of the jurisdiction) elapse
between default and conversion of the collateral. This time factor is
often discussed as an opportunity for the borrower to redeem the collateral, but this obscures a second crucial point. The foreclosure period is a time for negotiation between the borrower and lender. It is
commonplace for economic analyses of law to note that negotiation is
not costless, but it is still relatively uncommon to focus on the need
for time within which negotiations can take place. Successful negotiations require an opportunity for the parties to exchange information in a credible fashion. 35 This bargaining process often involves
sequential offers and responses calculated to communicate intentions
and beliefs in a manner that simple statements of fact or intent cannot convey credibly. The equity of redemption, by compelling a period
of delay between default and liquidation of the collateral, creates the
13 6
time that may be needed for negotiations to succeed.
In this way, the equity of redemption may serve a similar
function in fostering settlements as do the rules of discovery in litigation contexts. Discovery proceedings encourage settlements in a
number of ways. 3 7 First, by facilitating the exchange of information,
they reduce the informational asymmetries that may block negotiations. Second, the prospect of costly and time-consuming discovery

134. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividinga Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1058-61 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, On the
Choice Between PropertyRules and LiabilityRules, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 233,234-35, 243 (1980).
135. "[Clostly delays are necessary to communicate sufficient information credibly. The
process of bargaining is inherently necessary to align the parties' expectations so as to allow an
agreement; or, the process can fail, leading to an inefficient impasse or recourse to an arbitrator
or court." John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 45, 101 (1993); see also Daniel A. Babush, The PractitionersCorner, 22 REAL EST.
L.J. 332, 334 (1994) ("There are two keys to reaching a successful outcome. The first is
maintaining communication throughout the acrimonious negotiation.
The second is
establishing a common view of the property's realistic potential.").
136. See generallyJoseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons, Cheap Talk Can Matterin Bargaining,
48 J. ECON. THEORY 221 (1989) (discussing use of "talk" in trading probability of continued serious negotiations for bargaining position).
137. I do not mean to suggest that the effects of discovery are simple or that discovery always increases the likelihood of settlement. Some types of disclosure will increase the likelihood of settlement and other types will reduce it. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 435-39.(1994).

Overall, however, the pooling of the information held by both parties is likely to result in a narrowing of the gap between the parties' expectations, thus facilitating settlement.
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may encourage the parties to settle.138 These very same factors apply

to the equity of redemption and the concomitant need to foreclose.
The equity of redemption may also foster renegotiation by
providing a valuable bargaining chip to a borrower who otherwise has
little or nothing to offer. 139 A lender might be willing to work out a
default situation if the borrower can convince the lender that it has
faith in the project, but this may require more than verbal assurances
from the borrower. The lender wants some tangible sign of the borrower's beliefs. If the loan is nonrecourse, offers to increase the interest rate or permit the lender to share in future appreciation of the
collateral do nothing to satisfy this concern, because the borrower is
offering nothing more than the lender is already entitled to through
foreclosure on the property. 140 If the borrower has significant outside
assets, an agreement to accept personal liability or to pledge
additional assets may provide an adequate signal, 4 ' but for a
borrower in financial distress, outside assets are often not available.
The remaining signal available to the borrower is an agreement to
waive the equity of redemption, thus ensuring the lender a higher
recovery (by saving foreclosure delays and expenses) upon any future
default.

42

The role of the equity of redemption in fostering efficient renegotiations may explain a puzzling aspect of the law. While the equity
of redemption cannot be waived in the initial loan documents, courts
are sometimes willing to permit it to be waived in a workout context,
subject to strict judicial scrutiny of the underlying fairness of the

138. See Robert B. Wilson, Strategic and Informational Barriers to Negotiation, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 108, 114 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995):

[Discovery procedures] contribute to an equalized evidentiary basis for the trial, and
before the trial they can narrow the informational gap and promote settlements; even
the prospect of costly discovery can encourage early settlement. On the other hand, to
the extent they impose costs on the other party they can enable a war of attrition ....

Id.
139. See Tracht, supra note 77, at 344-46.
140. Cf. John M. Geppert & Gordon V. Karels, Mutually Beneficial Loan Workouts, 16 J.
ECON. & FIN. 103, 109 (1992) (noting that borrowers will accept any workout offer from the
lender where the borrower suffers no penalty for subsequent default).
141. See Mann, Strategy, supra note 21, at 204 (reporting that in eight out of twelve cases
in which the lender agreed to a workout that included formal payment concessions, the
borrower agreed "to make significant cash contributions of one form or another"). In one other

case, the borrower agreed to assume personal liability for the loan unless it voluntarily
conveyed the property to the lender-that is, unless it waived the equity of redemption-upon
any future default. See id. at 206.
142. See id. For cases illustrating this principle, see Wensel v. Flatte, 764 S.W.2d 627, 62829 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989) and Gillam v. Michigan Mortgage Investment Corp., 194 N.W. 981, 982
(Mich. 1923).
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transaction.143 This makes sense, particularly where the court is convinced that the renegotiation would fail absent the waiver. It would
be perverse for the court to insist on a term intended to aid a future
renegotiation if it would doom the current one.
The equity of redemption also facilitates renegotiation by mitigating the bilateral monopoly problem, serving as a check on the
lender's incentive to act opportunistically to obtain the collateral
where the collateral value exceeds the debt. Should the lender attempt to secure the collateral by inducing a breach, or persist in acting unreasonably after default in order to secure the lion's share of
the value available through renegotiation, the borrower has an "exit
option": it can retain the property by refinancing prior to completion
of the foreclosure by the lender. Indeed, Ronald Mann's recent empirical work supports the expectation that this would be a primary
strategy for borrowers facing the prospect of default.14 If lender enforcement were quick and inexpensive, the borrower might be unable
to refinance in time. Thus, the delay caused by "cumbersome" foreclosure processes may alleviate the bilateral monopoly situation by creating an opportunity for the borrower to bring in third parties to compete with the lender.
On the other hand, the equity of redemption creates several
opportunities for a mortgagor to try to enhance its position vis-h-vis
the lender. Borrowers may be tempted to threaten default in order to
secure a renegotiated agreement even if default is not in fact likely to
occur.145 The ability to impose costs on the lender through lengthy
foreclosure processes may become another weapon in a borrower's negotiating arsenal, a tool in the destructive process of strategic bargaining. Thus, mortgagor protections may increase the risk of
borrower opportunism.
These perverse incentives will be mitigated if the lender can
recover these increased costs from the borrower. Consider the
borrower's calculus: The borrower believes that the property is worth
more than the debt, but is considering whether to threaten default to
extract improved terms from its lender. Should the bluff fail, the
lender has the right to use the collateral to collect its debt, plus
interest (typically at a default rate) for the negotiation period, plus
fees and costs. Where the borrower believes there is equity, the
threat of bearing the lender's costs should the bluff fail should be a
143. See cases cited supranote 52.
144. See infra text accompanying notes 151-53.
145. See, e.g., Bester, supra note 104, at 73 (discussing the possibility of a borrower
strategically threatening default).
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significant deterrent to strategic bluffing. 146 The same may be true if
the loan was made with personal recourse against the borrower. 147
However, it is common for commercial real estate loans to be made on
a nonrecourse basis.' 48 This does not mean that lenders are unaware
of the risk. It is common even for nonrecourse loans to have "carveouts" from the nonrecourse provision, stating that the borrower will
be personally liable for the debt in specified circumstances. These
carve-outs are an attempt to deal with the moral hazard problem
inherent in nonrecourse financing, and they typically address
situations in which the borrower is at fault. 14 Among the situations
for which lenders commonly seek personal liability is the assertion of
a nonmeritorious defense, counterclaim, or bankruptcy proceeding by
the borrower. 150
In fact, the data supports the conclusion that the primary
function of mortgage law, upon default, is to permit the extra-legal
resolution of the situation, whether by refinancing and paying off the
lender, selling the collateral, or negotiating a workout. Foreclosure is
a last resort, rarely used unless the borrower has no equity to preserve and the parties find themselves unable to negotiate a resolution.
Thus, out of nineteen troubled commercial real estate loans studied by
Professor Mann, the borrower retained control of the collateral
through a workout in eleven cases, 151 the property was sold in two,

146 Similarly, lenders often insist that any debt or interest rate relief be paid for by a
share of the "upside potential," making renegotation relatively unattractive to a borrower who
truly believes the property is worth more than the debt.
147. Cf Bester, supra note 104, at 73, 84-85. Bester suggests that outside collateral (in
addition to the mortgaged property) may serve this role, but there is no reason why the prospect
of personal liability cannot equally serve to discipline borrowers and discourage opportunistic
threats of default. See id.
148. See Mann, Strategy, supra note 21, at 201. Mann reports that all 21 of the troubled
real estate loans in his study, made by an insurance company, were nonrecourse. See id. He
does not state whether the nonrecourse provisions had any carve-outs of significance. See id.
149. See, e.g., Billie J. Ellis, Jr. & Drew G. Alexandrou, Negotiatingand DocumentingReal
Estate Loan Transactions--CommonlyNegotiatedProvisions (with Forms), 17 BANKING & COM.
LENDING L. 1, 13 (1997) (noting that the evolution of carve-outs in nonrecourse lending included
"bad acts" by the borrower).
150. For an example of this type of nonrecourse carve-out in a forbearance agreement, see
John D. Hastie, Real Estate Workouts, 1 REAL EST. DEFAULTS, WORKOUTS, & REORGANIZATIONS
235, 274 (1993), where it states that:
All limitations on recourse to the Borrower or any other person contained in the Loan
Documents will be null, void and of no further effect on the date a Debtor Relief
Proceeding is filed and thereafter the Borrower and all other such persons will be fully
liable for payment of the Loan and the Lender will be entitled to exercise unlimited recourse against the Borrower and all other such persons.
See also Portia Owen Morrison & Mark A. Seann, Carving Up The 'Carve-Outs' in Nonrecourse
Loans, PROB. & PROP. May/June 1995, at 8-10.

151. See Mann, Strategy,supra note 21, at 208.
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and the property was consensually delivered to the lender in three.52
The lender was forced to a contested foreclosure in only three cases
(sixteen percent of the troubled loans studied).15s
VI. MORTGAGOR PROTECTIONS AS MANDATORY TERMS
The role of the equity of redemption in fostering efficient renegotiation after default may seem adequate justification for making it a
mandatory element of mortgage law, but in fact this only brings the
question back one stage. Even if we were to conclude that the equity
of redemption is an efficient rule in most secured financing transactions, it remains for us to explain why it should be imposed on the
parties, rather than presented as an optional or default term. After
all, parties for whom the equity of redemption would be efficient could
include it in their financing agreements. Presumably, though, there
would be some parties for whom the equity of redemption would not
be a valuable term (perhaps the probability of asymmetric information that would preclude efficient renegotiation is low), and these
parties could choose to omit the equity of redemption. In fact, as
noted above, parties have often sought to eliminate the equity of
redemption from their transactions.M Thus, the question remains:
Why is the equity of redemption a mandatory component of secured
financing transactions? History and inertia seem weak explanations
for the survival of a rule that parties have continually sought to
overturn.
In fact, the judicial insistence on the equity of redemption can
be justified economically-it may solve a market failure caused by the
strategic bargaining incentives faced by borrowers. 165 Recent work
has shown a variety of circumstances in which strategic bargaining
may keep parties from incorporating an efficient term into their

152. See id. at 210.

153. See id.
154. See supratext accompanying notes 3-4.
155. Various models have shown that different combinations of transaction costs may lead
to inefficient contracts among sophisticated parties. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Benjamin
Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts CanEnhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
381, 381-83 (1990) (asymmetric information that cannot be verified, ex post, by the courts);
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 93-95 (asymmetric information combined with market power
in the informed party); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 100, at 732-35 (costless contracting, market
power in the offeror, and private information in the offeree); Johnston, Default
Rules/MandatoryPrinciples,supra note 113, at 634-35 (asymmetric information combined with
market power in the uninformed party); Talley, supra note 61, at 1198-99 (asymmetric
information and bilateral monopoly).
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contract, and in which mandatory terms may allow the parties to
reach efficient contracts otherwise unobtainable.156
Phillipe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin offer a model directly
relevant to the mortgagor protection scenario, showing that a borrower may be unwilling to ask for efficient contractual protections if
such a request would lead the lender to view it (erroneously) as a
15
high-risk borrower and therefore seek more onerous terms.
Moreover, they demonstrate that mandatory borrower protections
may enhance the efficiency of contracts by including terms that borrowers desire but are unwilling to request given the response such a
request would engender.158 The efficiency of such restrictions depends
on whether there will be a pooling equilibrium (all parties request or
do not request protections, and the request or failure to request
protections conveys no information to the other side) or a separating
equilibrium (some types of borrowers request protection and others do
not, thus communicating their "type" to the lender). 59
Assume, for example, that real estate projects may be either
"high-risk" or "low-risk," and that borrowers know which category
their projects are in but that lenders find it impossible to determine
the quality of the project. If lenders cannot distinguish between highrisk and low-risk projects, they will have to lend at an interest rate
that reflects the average risk, and as a result, borrowers with low-risk
projects will end up subsidizing borrowers with high-risk projects.
Low-risk borrowers should be able to borrow at lower cost if
they can demonstrate the quality of their projects, and they may attempt to do this by offering lenders greater protections in the event of
default. High-risk borrowers may be unwilling to match this offer
because, given their higher risk of default, the offer is relatively more

156. See, e.g., Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 155, at 382-83; Ian Ayres, The Possibilityof
Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 400 (1991) (noting that private incentives of competing parties lead to inefficient and substandard results); Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 100, at 762-66 (noting inefficiencies that may arise when one party has private information
and the other party has some market power); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz,
Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of
Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 230, 247 (1993) (noting examples
of the possibility that "court-imposed restrictions on private contracts [can] improve efficiency"
when parties have assymetrical information); Morten Hviid, Default Rules and Equilibrium
Selection of Contract Terms, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 233, 241 (1996) (arguing that "default"
rules of law enhance efficiency and lower transaction costs); Johnston, Default
Rules/Mandatory Principles,supra note 113, at 340-50 (noting the inefficiencies that result
from incomplete information).
157. See Aghion & Hermalin, supranote 155, at 383-87.
158. This obviously does not mean that all borrower protections enhance efficiency, only
that given certain sets of assumptions, it is possible for such protections to do so.
159. See Johnston, Default Rules/MandatoryPrinciples,supra note 113, at 372,385-88.
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costly to them.160 If this is so, then low-risk borrowers will be able to
separate themselves from high-risk borrowers, but at the cost of
granting greater than optimal protections to the lender (such as
waiving the equity of redemption) in case of default. In other words,
the need to signal the quality of their projects may induce good borrowers to consent to inefficient lender protections. 161
Alternatively, high-risk borrowers may find it worthwhile to
match the lender protections offered by low-risk borrowers, rather
than being forced to pay the higher interest rates that would be required if lenders could identify them as high-risk.62 If it is worthwhile for high-risk borrowers to match the signal offered by low-risk
borrowers, the result will be a pooled equilibrium. Yet this result
may not only be inefficient relative to the separating equilibrium that
would be available if low-risk borrowers had a signal they could use to
indicate their quality to lenders, it may be less efficient than the
pooled equilibrium that would result if both types of borrowers
refused to waive their protections.
Thus, one function of an immutable borrower protection, like
the equity of redemption, may be to inhibit a form of inefficient competition between borrowers who would otherwise find themselves in
the position of bargaining away an efficient contract term. 63 Note
that this signalling problem cannot be solved through a default rule. 164
If the default rule is that mortgages contain the equity of redemption,
lenders will ask each borrower to waive the protection and will draw
inferences from the borrower's consent or refusal. Similarly, if the
default rule is to omit the equity of redemption, then requests by borrowers to include it, even if it is efficient, may not be forthcoming.

160. See Ayres, supra note 156, at 395.
161. For an analysis of this phenomenon in the context of corporate contracting, see i at
392-401.
162. See id. at 397-98.
163. Ayres points to three principal types of intervention used to deal with this type of
problem: penalty defaults, single-sided immutable rules, and immutable rules. See id. at 40102. In Ayres's terms, the equity of redemption is a single-sided, immutable rule, in that the
lender may agree to give the borrower more protections than the equity of redemption, but the
borrower cannot agree to take less. See id.
164. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner have pointed out that defaults may be chosen to compel
the provision of information. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 100, at 744-46. If the law
imposes a default contrary to the desires of a party with private information, they may be forced
to disclose that information in order to negotiate a contractual reversal of the default rule. In
this way, parties are forced to disclose private information, correcting the informational
asymmetry and allowing for an efficient separating equilibrium. However, separating equilibria

are not always preferable to pooling equilibria, and where the pooling equilibrium is superior, a
legal structure that facilitates nondisclosure may be preferable. See, e.g., Hviid, supranote 156,
at 241.
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Only an immutable rule can solve the dilemma. As the title to Aghion
and Hermalin's article asserts, "Legal Restrictions on Private
Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency." 165

In Aghion and Hermalin's model, the efficient contract is not
reached because seeking an efficient term will create a false impression (that the firm is a high-risk borrower, when in fact it is not). The
contrary problem may also exist: a party may decline to seek efficient
protections where the request will communicate truthful information
to the opposing side about the likely value of performance. 166 Thus,
good borrowers may prefer not to signal to lenders the full value of
their projects, for fear of weakening their bargaining power in any
167
subsequent renegotiation.
This Article is not intended to offer or defend any particular
model of either the initial negotiation between borrowers and lenders
or of renegotiations. Economists have provided numerous game theory models from which to choose, and the primary conclusion that
may be drawn is that results are highly sensitive to the particular
assumptions on which any given model is built.168 For example, Kahn
and Huberman present a model in which a nonrecourse mortgage
with strict foreclosure and an equitable right of redemption is most
efficient in permitting optimal renegotiation upon the development of
165. Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 155. Obviously, there are limits to this reasoning-it
does not follow that all borrower protections enhance efficiency. If borrower protections are
excessive, the moral hazard problem will outweigh negotiating benefits: borrowers who are
largely insulated from the adverse effects of failure will take inadequate care to maximize
returns on the project. See id. at 400; see also Ayres, supra note 156, at 403 (noting that the
moral hazard dilemma undermines the fiduciary/agent relationship).
166. For example, Johnston, Default Rules/MandatoryPrinciples,supra note 113, at 36873, argues that under the Uniform Commercial Code, the good faith requirement for the
enforceability of modifications is an immutable rule that tends to permit efficient renegotiations
while invalidating extortionate, inefficient ones. The good faith provision bars a party from
extorting a contractual change on the pretense of changed circumstances. See id. If the court
determines that the changed circumstances that purportedly warranted modification did not
exist, then the modification may be held unenforceable. See id. However, the parties might find
themselves unable to negotiate a "good faith" requirement for modifications if asking for such a
term communicates information about the requesting party. See id. at 371-72; see also Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 100, at 736 (noting that shippers may not disclose the extent of damages
when contracting a liquidated damages clause for fear carriers may charge higher fees upon
realizing the higher value of the cargo).
167. The concern is not that they will lose out in the current negotiation, because if the
market is competitive the lender cannot insist on more than a market rate of return. However,
if the disclosure affects subsequent renegotiations, when the parties are locked in a bilateral
monopoly, the borrower may still have good reason not to want to disclose. See Johnston,
DefaultRules/Mandatoy Principles,supranote 113, at 368-73.
168. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis ofLegal Disputes
and TheirResolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1078-80 (1989) (discussing how attempts to
model settlement negotiations "have produced, not a consensus among economists, but a variety
of predictive and normative theories that are rivals to each other").
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unforeseen contingencies. 169 Helmut Bester offers a model in which
70
deficiency liability may be needed to induce efficient renegotiation.
The underlying point is clear, however: Where there is significant private information, it cannot be assumed that unconstrained
negotiations about post-default remedies will result in optimal terms,
even among sophisticated commercial parties. Negotiations regarding
remedies are subject to an adverse selection dynamic that inherently
places them in a separate category from other contract terms. This
adverse selection problem explains several aspects of mortgage law
that are obscured by the conventional explanation that "necessitous
men are not truly free" and that the mortgage is therefore executed in
a situation of unequal bargaining power. 71' First, if borrower protections are simply a judicial response to unequal bargaining power,
overreaching lenders will switch to unregulated terms. If lenders are
prohibited from obtaining waivers of the equity of redemption, they
will use their bargaining power to extract higher interest rates, require additional collateral, and so on. Judicial oversight of one term
in a multifaceted relationship will not correct an imbalance in the
parties' underlying positions. However, if the inefficient signalling
argument is correct, then the courts' focus on default provisions
makes sense: these are the provisions that lenders could attempt to
use to distinguish between high- and low-risk borrowers (because
their cost is correlated with the probability of default), and hence are
the provisions that may be rendered inefficient by adverse selection.
The market failure that this type of regulation addresses is not a
general imbalance in bargaining strength between powerful lenders
and impecunious borrowers, but the inability of the market to
generate efficient post-default remedies in the presence of asymmetric
information.
Moreover, if the risk of inefficient signalling is the primary
market failure justifying the imposition of the equity of redemption,
then it makes sense that courts insist on overseeing waivers entered
into as part of a renegotiation, rather than simply permitting the
equity of redemption to be freely waived after the initial transaction.
The informational asymmetry that may cause inefficient pooling
exists in the workout situation exactly as it does in the initial loan
process. If the equity of redemption were freely waivable after the
initial transaction, borrowers might find it impossible to resist lender

169. See Kahn & Huberman, Default,supra note 102, at 58-59.
170. See Bester, supra note 104, at 73, 84-85.
171. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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demands for waivers in workouts because lenders would read the
refusal as a signal that the borrower lacks faith in its workout
proposal. Simply prohibiting waivers as part of the workout process,
however, would probably be inefficient: the borrower's ability to
waive default rights as part of a workout may provide an important
signal to the lender that the borrower has faith in its own workout
proposal. 72 Judicial oversight provides a balance, limiting the ability
of the lender to extract such a waiver simply out of the borrower's fear
of signalling, without granting a valuable quidpro quo.
VII. CONCLUSION

The traditional critique of coercive creditor remedies was
couched in terms of fairness and equity: It was unfair for a defaulting
borrower to suffer a forfeiture, and would result in unjust enrichment
for the creditor to realize more than the amount of the debt.
Traditional law and economics scholarship responded that the cost of
banishing this type of unfairness was a less efficient credit market, in
which marginal borrowers would bear the cost of additional protections either through more onerous credit terms or the denial of credit
altogether. Defenders of borrower protections replied that the efficiency argument only worked in perfectly competitive markets, and
that market imperfections (e.g., cognitive limitations of borrowers)
provided an economic, not just a moral, rationale for regulation.
However persuasive or unpersuasive these arguments may be in the
consumer context, they have carried little weight in discussions of
commercial transactions. As shown in this Article, however, the debate is not the "fairness" of intervention versus the "efficiency" of the
free market, even in the context of sophisticated commercial parties.
Even if we assume fully rational, sophisticated commercial parties
operating in a competitive market, strategic bargaining may prevent
the formation of efficient credit contracts absent a public structure of
mandatory law governing creditor remedies.
That said, I do not claim that existing creditor protections are
in any sense "optimal--merely that signalling problems disprove the
argument that restrictions on creditor remedies are inherently
inefficient. The specification of economically efficient rights will
depend, at the very least, on the development of game theory models
that can accurately capture the dynamics of the marketplace. I admit
172. See Tracht, supra note 77, at 344-46.
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to some skepticism about the likelihood of developing such models,
given the sensitivity of most models to small variations in assumptions. Indeed, assuming that credit markets vary extensively along a
number of relevant dimensions (sophistication of borrower and lender,
transaction size, contracting costs, market power, and informational
asymmetries, to name a few), and that the legal system is unlikely to
be able to tailor and apply optimal rules for each set of variables, the
search for "optimal" rules of secured credit may be equivalent to
searching for Lewis Carroll's snark. If so, then economics cannot
provide definitive guidance in the search for efficient legal rules. It
can only tell us when our arguments are unconvincing or incomplete,
and perhaps help us to find that grain of truth, buried in the structure of the law, which we might otherwise miss.
The analysis offered above has broad ramifications: It suggests that in any market characterized by substantial informational
asymmetries, there may be an economic justification for immutable
legal rules. This provides a counterpoint to the increasing tendency
towards contractarianism in various areas of law that have traditionally been viewed as immutable. For example, recent years have
seen more extensive debate about the desirability of permitting corpo73
rate and partnership fiduciary duties to be contractually modified.
A similar debate is taking place in areas of bankruptcy law. 74 These
debates have, in many cases, evolved into a debate about whether
contractual or mandatory terms are more efficient. 7 5 The points that
should be emphasized by the analysis presented here are (1) that the
efficiency of immutable rules versus contractual rules will depend on
the specific details of the market structure, and (2) that it requires a
remarkable degree of self-confidence or hubris to conclude, in any
given cirucmstance, that one's understanding of the market structure
is sufficient to permit a confident choice between the two for any
6
given rule.y

173. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); John C. Cofee, Jr., No Exit?:
Opting Out, the ContractualTheory of the Corporation,and the Special Case of Remedies, 53
BRoom L. REv. 919 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractand Fiduciary
Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993); Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989); Symposium on the Future of the UnincorporatedFirm, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 389 (1997).
174. See, e.g., Thomas G. Kelch & Michael K Slattery, The Mythology of Waivers of
Bankruptcy Privileges,31 IND. L. REV. 897 (1998); Alan Schwartz, A ContractTheory Approach
to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998); Tracht, supra note 77.
175. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 173, at 15.
176. The ultimate conclusion is that the choice between proposed immutable and default
rules in any particular case will be, in a sense, procedural rather than substantive, devolving to
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Finally, the courts' long-standing and vigorous defense of the
equity of redemption presumably reflects a deep-seated intuition that
something is wrong with a waiver of redemption rights-even if
courts have been unable to articulate the problem in a coherent fashion. 177 As shown in this Article, the common law rule may be rooted in
an implicit or tacit understanding of important elements of market
dynamics and contractual relationships, even though judges and legal
scholars have never been able to offer detailed or convincing models of
the processes at work. There is often a gap between what we think
we understand about the world, and what we can rigorously explain
about it; I hope this Article helps to bridge that gap in the realm of
mortgage law.

an analysis of the ability of and incentives for the respective proposed decisionmakers to avoid
and correct mistakes.
177. I am grateful to my colleague Vern Walker for raising this point.

